Muddled Loyalty: A Study of Islamic Centers in Boston Area by Li, Ruiqian
Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:108026
This work is posted on eScholarship@BC,
Boston College University Libraries.
Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2018
Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted.
Muddled Loyalty: A Study of Islamic
Centers in Boston Area
Author: Ruiqian Li
Muddled Loyalty: A Study of Islamic 
Centers in Boston Area 
 
Ruiqian Li 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
Submitted to the Faculty of  
the Department of Political Science 
in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Boston College 
Morrissey College of Arts and Sciences 
Graduate School 
 
 
May, 2018 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright [2018] [Ruiqian Li] 
   
 
Muddled Loyalty: A Study of Islamic Centers in Boston Area 
 
Ruiqian Li 
 
Advisor: Peter Skerry Ph.D. 
 
 
 
Abstract: This thesis is a further study of Peter Skerry’s 2011 article, “the Muslim-
American Muddle,” in which he argues that not only non-Muslim Americans are 
worrying about Muslims’ loyalty issue due to the fear of radical Islamism and 
terrorism, but also Muslims are confused. My basic argument is that Muslims are still 
suffering from their muddled loyalty. It is not because they are disloyal but because, 
in light of Grodzins, their organizations guide them in different directions which are 
not always en route to national loyalty as non-Muslims expect. Inspired by Morton 
Grodzins’s theory on social structure and national loyalty in liberal democracies and 
James Q. Wilson’s insightful study on political organizations, this research has sought 
to understand the Muslim muddle with an in-depth inquiry and examination on one 
of the most common and important Islamic organizations—Islamic centers and 
mosques with an ethnographical method. The evidence of this thesis was collected 
between April 2016 and December 2017. 
In fact, I almost visited every mosque in Massachusetts. However, I was not always 
lucky to build strong connections with many centers for various reasons. In this 
thesis, I only select those mosques that I had visited more than three times. And I try 
my best to interview as many leaders as possible. I also manage to keep a geographical 
and sectarian balance in my sample. I hope to cover all types of mosques in Boston 
area. My findings are interesting, though of course often confusing and may 
contradicting with each other but I am duty-bound to report them even if it may had 
negative impact on the generalization power of my argument. I find that Islamic 
centers have different goals and offer different incentives to overcome collective 
actions problems. Both solidarity and political engagement are valued by Islamic 
centers in general, but individual organizations have different preferences which are 
results of divergent immigrant experiences. So the organizational aspect of Muslims 
community is fragmented. However, the increasing external political pressure in the 
post 9/11 period did not overcome the problem but aggravated it by simply 
empowering purposive mosques like ISBCC in public sphere. 
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Introduction 
“Who is our friend? Who is our enemy?”1 Political theologian Karl Schmidt, by 
citing the first sentence from the first essay from Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, 
declares that a clear identification of friend-enemy relationship is the first task of 
politics.2 In the light of Schmidt, all forms of politics can be reduced to politics of 
identity. However, in real politics, it is much easier and more feasible to identify “our 
enemy” than “our friend.” This lesson is still alive in the era of War on Terror. 
President Donald J. Trump, like President George W. Bush, divides Muslims in two 
groups: “with us” and “against us.” 3  “With us” Muslims are good, moderate, 
assimilated, and loyal to this country while “against us” Muslims are nothing but the 
opposite. Both presidents agree it is necessary to deal with “against us” Muslims with 
tough tactics. 
The most efficient and easiest convenient political choice was to ban the entry of 
Muslims who are suspected of being “against us.” Since January 27, 2017, President 
Trump had issued three controversial executive orders, what the media call “Muslim 
travel bans,” in succession. The bans stopped citizens from seven Muslim-majority 
countries entering the United States and their visa would be denied or suspended 
                                                        
1 Mao, Zedong, and United States. Joint Publications Research Service. Issuing Body. Collected Works of Mao 
Tse-tung (1917-1949)., 1978. 
2 Schmidt claims that “the specific political distinction is that between friend and enemy.” See Schmidt, Carl The 
Concept of the Political. Expanded Edition (1932), trans. by G. Schwab, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2007, 26. 
3 "Over time it's going to be important for nations to know they will be held accountable for inactivity…You're 
either with us or against us in the fight against terror." See “You are either with us or against us” 
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because “the United States must ensure that those admitted to this country do not 
bear hostile attitudes toward it and its founding principles.”4 A week after, one of my 
interviewees who is a board member of a local mosque near Boston told me that his 
wife’s H-1b visa extension was denied though she is not from any of the listed 
countries. The guiding principle behind Trump’s Muslim bans is clear that the United 
States is not tolerant of all religious and ideological doctrines. Not surprisingly, 
leading domestic Muslim organizations such as the Islamic Society of North America 
(ISNA) and the Council of American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) soon publicly 
condemned the “anti-Muslim” orders and organized protesting activities. Civil right 
organizations such as American Civil Liberty Union (ACLU) also joined and criticized 
the orders of being unconstitutional and racist that politically discriminate and 
persecute Muslims because these orders were driven by the Islamophobic ideology 
held by the Trump’s Administration and the Republican party. The civil rights 
organizations sought to challenge the order via legal means and gained several 
injunctions and a restraining order from multiple federal Judges at different district 
federal courts and appellate courts.5  
These cases went to the Supreme Court in June 2017. The Court, surprisingly, 
ruled in a complicated way. It only stopped the government from banning the entry 
of foreign nationals who have “bona fide [relationships] with a person or entity in the 
United States.” But the Court stood with the Administration on that it was 
                                                        
4 Exec. Order No. 13769, 3 C.F.R. 2 (2017). 
5 “Timeline of the Muslim Ban” American Civil Liberties Union of Washington https://www.aclu-
wa.org/pages/timeline-muslim-ban Accessed Jan, 19, 2018. 
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“Government’s interest in preserving national security against the hardships caused 
to respondents by temporary denials of entry into the country.”6 The Court’s opinion 
echoed its unanimous opinion with regard to Mormons’ religious right over polygamy 
more than a century ago in the case Reynolds v. United State (1879), that recognized 
government’s power can “interfere…with [religious] practices” and the freedom of 
religious practice cannot be superior to the common good.7  
Trump’s Muslim bans reveal the Administration’s suspicion toward Muslims. 
Following political debates on the bans echo political scientist Peter Skerry’s 
observation seven years ago that on one hand “America has reached a political and 
intellectual stalemate regarding the Muslims in its midst,” on the other hand 
“[Muslims’] loyalty to this nation is muddled.”8 There are three main reasons for the 
muddled loyalty, argues Skerry: political institutionalization of “cosmopolitan 
values,” “America's apparent unwillingness to place serious demands on its citizens,” 
and most important but also subtlest, “lingering influence of Islamist leaders, 
institutions, and ideology.” 9  That non-Muslim Americans are so concerned with 
American Muslims’ loyalty is out of the fear of domestic terrorist activities.10 Skerry 
                                                        
6 Trump v. Hawaii, No. 16-1540 (U.S. Aug. 24, 2017), 11.  
7 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L. Ed. 244, 25 L. Ed. 2d 244 (1879). 
 
8 Skerry, Peter. "The Muslim-American Muddle." National Affairs 9 (2011): 14-15. 
9 Ibid, 15. 
10 Saifuddin Ahmed and Jorg Matthes conducted a multiple-method analysis of a sample of 345 published 
studies between 2000 and 2015 on media’s impact on construction of Muslim American identities. The two 
scholars in communication find that most academic researches trapped with paradigms adopted in public 
discourse on Muslims that often link Muslims and Islam with fundamentalism and terrorism. In addition, they 
find that Islamophobic sentiment is mainly triggered by “acts of terrorism.” See Ahmed, Saifuddin, and Jörg 
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acknowledges that many of the fears are not reasonable and “too alarmist.” Instead of 
overreacting on Muslims’ loyalty issue, he warns, the more desirable goal for non-
Muslims is to “to exert constructive pressure, in different ways and to different 
degrees, on Muslim Americans — leaders and ordinary citizens alike — to "deal with 
their baggage.”11 Both Muslims and non-Muslims are responsible to collaborate to 
reconcile tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims in reasonable ways.  
It has been seven years since the article got published. Is there any improvement 
on the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims? The answer is complicated. 
The political integration of American Muslims is successful. According to Irene 
Bloemraad, a full political integration consists of two standards: “acquisition of legal 
or formal citizenship and engagement in the political system of the adopted 
country.”12 With regard to the first one, over eighty percent of Muslims are either 
naturalized or American born. As to the second standard, American Muslims now are 
the most active religious minority group in the Democratic coalition. Not to mention 
that many Muslims have been elected to important political offices. Take 
Representative Keith Ellison who is now also the deputy chair of the Democratic 
National Convention for instance.13 In addition, over seventy percent of registered 
Muslim voters voted for Democratic candidates like Hilary Clinton and Bernie 
                                                        
Matthes. "Media Representation of Muslims and Islam from 2000 to 2015: A Meta-analysis." International 
Communication Gazette 79, no. 3 (2017): 219-44. 
11 Skerry, “the Muslim-American Muddle,” 15. 
12 Bloemraad, Irene. Becoming a Citizen : Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and 
Canada. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006, 5-6. 
13 Wikiquote contributors, "Keith Ellison," Wikiquote, , 
https://en.wikiquote.org/w/index.php?title=Keith_Ellison&oldid=2356111 (accessed Feb 2, 2018). 
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Sanders in the last 2016 presidential election.14  
However, the tension between Muslims and non-Muslims is intensified in public 
sphere. In July, 2017, Pew Research Center published their recent survey on American 
Muslims that indicates a majority of American Muslims concerned their position in 
the American society because they think “the media is unfair to Muslims and that 
other Americans do not view Islam as part of mainstream U.S. society.”15 On the other 
hand, many Muslim leaders are more politically aggressive than before. At the 
Community Service Recognition Luncheon of ISNA’s 54th annual convention in June 
2017, Muslim feminist activist Linda Sarsour, wearing a green hijab, delivered a high 
controversial speech against the rising Islamophobia in the Trump’s administration. 
She said:  
“What I believe…is that you can be unapologetically Muslim…hold strong 
conviction, have a strong ideology of politics, and still become a mainstream 
American who can inspire and resonate with people outside of the Muslim 
community…that Muslim community should standing up for any and all 
communities were oppressed in this country because not only that is the right 
thing to do, it is the Islamic thing to do...Dissent is the highest form of 
patriotism.”16 
 
The framework in Linda Sarsour’s speech, resounding with Howard Dean’s address 
on ISNA’s convention in 2003 that “there is nothing more American than protest,” is 
identical with that of identity politics and politics of social justice, the basic political 
                                                        
14 Pew Research Center, July 26, 2017, “U.S. Muslims Concerned About Their Place in Society, but Continue to 
Believe in the American Dream.” http://www.pewforum.org/2017/07/26/findings-from-pew-research-centers-
2017-survey-of-us-muslims/ Accessed Aug, 2, 2017. 
15 Ibid.  
16 “Linda Sarsour addressing at 54th Annual ISNA Convention,” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k0tr0CFik2k Accessed Aug, 5, 2017. 
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assumption of which is “[minorities] always lose”17 The rhetoric, of course, did not 
help to reconcile the tension because it proposed a more aggressive strategy to 
directly fight against political discrimination and persecution. It is not surprising that 
Sarsour’s aggressive speech soon received a lot of critiques from the political 
conservative side. It stirred a new round of heated public debate on potential threats 
from Muslims. Cases on both sides not only betray an intensifying relationship 
between Muslims and non-Muslims in public sphere, but also show that the Muslim 
loyalty issue has become so important that it directly participate in polarizing 
American politics. How should we explain the complicated Muslim loyalty issue? It is 
the focus of this thesis. 
Political Loyalty and Social Structure. Despite ideological and partisan difference, 
almost every American values national loyalty and despises disloyalty, especially in 
the age of war. National loyalty connects individuals’ emotional attachment with 
national interests: it’s the foundation of national identity. However, in liberal 
democracy like America, national loyalty is also conditional because it does not 
require absolute and unconditional submission to political and social authorities as 
do traditional despotic regimes and modern authoritarian states. On the contrary, 
national loyalty in liberal democracy, as political scientist Morton Grodzins defines, 
                                                        
17 About Howard Dean, see Ahmed, Leila. A Quiet Revolution : The Veil's Resurgence, from the Middle East to 
America. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011. About the “always lose” statement, see Robert Park: “I am 
not quite clear in my mind that I am opposed to race riots. The thing that I am opposed to is that the Negro 
should always lose.” Cited by Peter Skerry, “The Racialization of Immigration Policy,” in Keller, Morton., and 
Melnick, R. Shep. Taking Stock : American Government in the Twentieth Century. Woodrow Wilson Center Series. 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1999. 119.  Also see Amaney Jamal “The 
Racialization of American Muslims” Sinno, Abdulkader H. Muslims in Western Politics. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2009. 
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follows a reciprocal principle as it is often found in voluntary associations that “one 
is loyal to the groups that provide gratifications because what serves the group serves 
the self.”18  Therefore, national loyalty in liberal democracy is fluid and unstable 
because it is inevitably in competition with other types of group loyalties.  
So what can we do to guarantee loyalty and to dispel disloyalty? Grodzins 
reminds us of that most citizens “are loyal because they are not disloyal.” So instead 
of focusing on finding out who are loyal citizens, he suggests that we should turn our 
attention to what may cause disloyalty: “Persons are disloyal because the entire 
weight of society repels them from open acts of national disloyalty.”19 After all, if 
loyalty to a given group is built on reciprocal relationship between the group and 
individual members, triggers to loyalty and disloyalty will be many because different 
individuals have different preferences and interests. Grodzins points out that social 
structure matters more than ideological and religious convictions. The function of 
social structure is to channel “satisfactory private life” and “loyalties to voluntary 
group” to national loyalty.20 After an elaborated and in-depth analysis on many cases 
of disloyal Japanese Americans during the World War II, he finds that loyalty is 
sustained by various multiple-step nation-individual ties, including direct ties and 
                                                        
18 Grodzins, Morton. The Loyal and the Disloyal : Social Boundaries of Patriotism and Treason. Chicago, Ill., U.S.A.: 
University of Chicago Press, 1956, 7. 
19 Ibid, 30. 
20 Ibid. 
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indirect ones, which depends on “life-situation.”21 He concludes that when a group 
find itself alienated and marginalized by the mainstream society and persecuted by 
the national government, it is likely to call for disloyalties because the nation, in this 
case, would be meaningless to them. In chapter ten of his book Grodzins continues his 
analysis on dynamics between (dis)loyalty and the social structure. He gives a three-
step test for national loyalty as responding to three levels of collective loyalties. The 
first step is to examine if the micro-level relationship between individual members 
and a given group are positive, the second step is to investigate the medium-level 
relationship that whether and how these group-individual connections can be linked 
with the nation, and the last is to ask that at macro-level if there is an alternative 
national loyalty. In sum, social structure of a given group matters because it plays a 
pivotal role in identifying the group’s position in the society.  
Two Images of American Muslims as Minority. Group identity, in light of 
Grodzins’s work, matters in determining someone’s national loyalty. Before 
discussing the loyalty issue of American Muslims, a general introduction of American 
Muslims is necessary. There are two images of American Muslims: one is public and 
another as statistic. The public image of American Muslims tells us that American 
Muslims are a highly solidary, moderate, and homogeneous faith-based immigrant 
race-like minority group. American Muslims are, in the word of Amaney Jamal, 
“racialized.” 22  The racialization of American Muslims is not something novel to 
                                                        
21 Ibid, 128. 
22 See Jamal, “Racialization of American Muslims” 
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Americans who like to discuss and examine immigrants as if they are racial minorities 
like Black Americans, it is because political definitions of majority and minority 
changed in the post-civil right era. When the Founders deliberated on the 
Constitution they wanted to protect minority from the “tyranny of majority.” But they 
assumed both majority and minority as fluid and short-term factions who were 
united because of shared temporary pulses for interests.23 To the founders, both 
majority and minority are up to personal choice: people associated in groups not 
because they have to but they choose to. Therefore, the American polity must be 
designed as a political apparatus to prevent majority to institutionalize their majority 
status through democratic procedures. However, in today’s politics, the minority’s 
status is institutionalized through racialization. According to Skerry, the conception 
of “minority” in the American context cannot be separated from racial terms and often 
has nothing to do with “a group’s numerical size.”24 In political discourse, racial and 
immigrant groups are interpreted as “involuntary minorities” who “understood that 
the American system was based on social class and minority conditions.”25 Causes 
behind the formal and informal institutionalization of racialization are too 
complicated to be clearly and comprehensively addressed here. But one thing is 
certain that racialization is a strategy widely adopted by immigrant leaders because 
                                                        
23 See James Madison, “Federalist Papers no. 10,” in Hamilton, Alexander, Madison, James, Jay, John, Rossiter, 
Clinton, and Kesler, Charles R. The Federalist Papers. New York, N.Y.: Signet Classic, 2003.  
24 See Skerry, Peter. Mexican Americans : The Ambivalent Minority. New York : Toronto: New York: Free Press ; 
Maxwell Macmillan Canada ; Maxwell Macmillan International, 1993. 
 
25 Ogbu, John U., and Herbert D. Simons. "Voluntary and Involuntary Minorities: a Cultural‐Ecological Theory 
of School Performance with Some Implications for Education." Anthropology & Education Quarterly 29, no. 2 
(1998): 145-146. 
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by defining their groups as racial minorities in the post-civil right era, their political 
assimilation process can be accelerated and they, as leaders with political ambition, 
will be politically empowered. The public image of American Muslims as a race-like 
minority group is a result of empowerment of American Islamists who constitute “a 
minority of a minority” among American Muslims. 26  The Islamists are now 
representing American Muslims before the non-Muslim public because they were the 
only “visible segment” of American Muslims in public discourse.27 
But, the statistic image tells an opposite story. Few non-Muslims appreciate facts 
that American Muslims are a highly diverse group and hence deeply divided. 
According to the very recent Pew Research Center’s survey on American Muslims, 
there are estimated 3.35 million of Muslims crossing all age ranges in the Untied 
States, which approximately represent 1.1 percent of the whole American population, 
and more than half of Muslims (58 percent) are reported foreign born immigrants. 
Muslims are also the fastest growing immigrant religious group in the United States 
who will soon represent over two percent of the whole American population. 28 
Majority of Muslim immigrants are from at least seventy-seven different countries. 
Let alone the high level of ethnic, racial, cultural, and religious diversities. In addition, 
the 2017 Pew’s survey reports a surprising fact that more than half of foreign-born 
                                                        
26 Ahmed, Leila. A Quiet Revolution : The Veil's Resurgence, from the Middle East to America. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2011, 265-306.  
27 See, Cesari, Jocelyne. When Islam and Democracy Meet : Muslims in Europe and in the United States. 1st ed. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, 124. 
28 Pew, “U.S. Muslims Concerned About Their Place in Society” 22. 
11 
 
Muslims (56 percent) come to this country after 2000, and few foreign-born Muslims 
came to this country before 1970s.29  In sum, American Muslims barely share an 
uniformed American Muslim identity due to their high diverse and rich immigrant 
backgrounds and experience. 
Multiple Dimensions in Muddled Muslim Loyalty in a Dynamic Time. Grodzins’s 
three-level paradigm of disloyalty test is useful because he emphasizes the 
importance of social structure in encouraging disloyalty. For sure, different groups 
have different incentives to be disloyal. The case of Mexican Americans in the 
twentieth century is different from that of Irish Catholics in the middle of nineteenth 
century and the case of racial groups is reasonably assumed to be different to that of 
religious groups because they have different concerns, history, and paths of 
Americanization.  
So in the case of American Muslims, one can safely assume that if relationship 
between Muslim and the mainstream American society continues to be intensified, 
more Muslims will be more likely to commit disloyalty than remain loyal to the Untied 
States. Partisan politics in the contemporary polarizing American political context 
plays as a significant role in triggering the intensification. As opposed to the 
Republican’s hard-power tactics, the Democrats’ agenda sounds more acceptable to 
Muslim leaders. Many Democrats publicly express their willingness to cooperate with 
“moderate” Muslim leaders and organizations who are affiliated with “the 
mainstream Islam” in many times.30 Despite of their ideological differences with the 
                                                        
29 Ibid, 33. 
30 Seek Rascoff, Samuel J. "Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of Counter-radicalization." Stanford 
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Republican, Democrats share the same policy goal with the Republican: preventing 
oversea terrorist organization recruiting domestic Muslims. What is different is that 
the Democrats prefer preventive policies that targeting at de-radicalizing theological 
ideologies and religious beliefs of domestic Muslims. The basic strategy is to promote 
“the mainstream Islam.” Samuel J. Rascoff, a law school professor from New York 
University, elaborately reviews the Counter-Reformation policy strategy adopted by 
the Obama Administration. He observes that the archetype of the American Counter-
Reformation policy is from the European model of Counter-Reformation. The 
European model includes two parts: 1. “institutionalizing representative Islamic 
bodies and empowering designated Muslim interlocutors;” 2. “facilitating the 
construction and maintenance of Islamic spaces.”31 It requires the government to 
publicly claim its theological preference with respect to the nature of Islam and true 
characteristics of Muslim communities. As a result, Rascoff concludes, the 
establishment of an “Official Islam” is inevitable. He is correct. There is a rising 
“Official Islam” in the Untied States. The official Islam proposed a de-culturalized 
(therefore it can be compatible with American culture), ahistorical, reductive, and 
more universal version of Islam which, in the words of Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and 
Adair T. Lummis, “[crystalizes] the faith into its simple and basic constituents” by 
“[removing] the accretions of centuries of commentary and dogmatic formulation and 
                                                        
Law Review 64, no. 1 (2012), 149. 
31 Haddad, Y. Y., and T. Golson. "Overhauling Islam: Representation, Construction, and Cooption of "Moderate 
Islam" in Western Europe." Journal of Church and State 49, no. 3 (2007): 487-515. 
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stressed what they understand to be the essential rational nature of man.”32 
 
The external political and social pressure for de-radicalization keeps increasing 
after the 9/11. On the other hand, Muslims’ loyalty is still suffering. The high 
immigrant diversity of American Muslim community suggests that American Muslim 
community may have multiple causes for their muddled loyalty. After my one and half 
years of interviewing over a hundred Muslims around the Untied States, I find there 
are three dimensions in public sphere that may lead Muslim to conflict with the 
American society.  
The first is the political identity. Muslims are ambiguous about the relationship 
between their identification with Muslim Ummah and their liberal democratic 
citizenship. Muslim scholar Mohammed A. Muqtedar Khan summarizes that there are 
four sources of collective Islamic identities in the United States. The first one is 
“shared understandings and collective memories of groups.” Members of all kinds of 
Muslim organizations, for example, often share similar experiences and similar 
understandings towards Islam and American society. The second is “ideal” that seeks 
to build an “acontextual and ahistorical” Islamic identity that connects Muslims with 
other co-religionists. Fundamentalism like salafism is a case. The third one is 
structural and political identity. With this identity Muslims are often view themselves 
as a diaspora of a particular nation-state rather than Americans. The last one is 
historical and traditional. This type of identity is defined by historical experience of a 
                                                        
32 Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck, and Lummis, Adair T. Islamic Values in the United States : A Comparative Study. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, 20. 
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given group and it often overlaps with theological, sectarian, and ethnic elements. 
Take Shi’ite Muslims as for instance.33 In the post-9/11 era, the Islamic ideal has 
become the most important and salient identity source to American Muslims.34 The 
Islamic ideal merges into the uniformed public image of American Muslims. However, 
it also befuddles Muslims because Muslim leaders gives no clear guidance on the 
relationship between Islamic ideal and American identity.  
In the word of Ayatollah Khomeini, “Islam is politics.”35 A Shi’ite Muslim I met at 
Boston College told me that though he disagrees with Khomeini in many aspects, he 
agrees with the statement. Since its inception, Islamic identity has been fused with 
political identity. The Muslim Ummah that the Prophet Muhammad sought to 
establish is not just a religious body like congregation fidelium, a voluntary gathering 
of the faithful that Protestantism values, but a theocratic body that demands absolute 
divine sovereignty. The history of Islam proves that it was the competition over 
political authority and leadership that divided Muslim Ummah rather than religious 
and theological divergence. The UCLA Islamic law professor Abou El Fadl elaborates 
in his book on the genealogy of the conception of legitimate rebellion in Islamic legal 
tradition. He finds that the legitimacy of rebellion as a form of political disloyalty to 
                                                        
33 See Mohommed A. Muqtedar Khan, “Muslim and Identity Politics in America,” in Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck, 
and Esposito, John L. Muslims on the Americanization Path? South Florida-Rochester-Saint Louis Studies on 
Religion and the Social Order ; v. 19. Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1998. 108-110. 
34 See Skerry, Peter “America’s Muslims Never Had to Unite – Until Now,” 
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/americas-muslims-never-had-to-unite-until-now/ Accessed Apirl 13, 
2016. 
35 “Islam is politics or it is nothing,” cited by Lewis, Bernard. Islam in History: Ideas, People, and Events in the 
Middle East. New Ed., Revised and Expanded (2nd Ed.). ed. Chicago: Open Court, 1993, 262. 
15 
 
temporary political authority had been the central concern for Muslim jurists and 
theologians. Three types of disloyalties were illegal and illegitimate according to 
traditional Muslim jurists: apostasy, brigands, and political rebellion. Despite 
fragmentation and inconsistence found in a thousand years of Muslim legal 
scholarship and practices on the issue of political disloyalty, one guiding principle is 
clear that general political loyalty to Muslim Ummah is widely recognized as 
necessary and important in Islamic tradition. Similar concerns also befuddle 
American Muslims. After all, the United States has been described as an un-Islamic 
country defined by Judea-Christian heritage. In fact, before the 9/11 event, as Skerry 
observes, leading Muslim jurists such as Muzammil Siddiqi discouraged American 
Muslims to stay in the United States and warned them of “real danger of assimilation 
to a non-Islamic culture.” 36  Ihsan Bagby, another influential American Muslim 
scholar, also frankly admitted that Muslims would never be “full citizens in the Untied 
States…because there is no way we can be fully committed to the institutions and 
ideologies of this country” 37  In addition, Islamic ideal is more attractive among 
American-born Muslim youth than their foreign-born parents. It is often interpreted 
as an anti-American political identity. Marcia Hermansen notes that “quite a number 
of Muslim youth in America are becoming rigidly conservative and condemnatory of 
their peers (Muslim and non-Muslim), their parents, and all who are not within a 
                                                        
36 Skerry, “The Muslim-American Muddle,” 20. 
37 Steven A. Johnson, “Political Activity of Muslims in America,” in Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck. The Muslims of 
America. Religion in America Series (Oxford University Press). New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, 115. 
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narrow ideological band of what I will define as internationalist, ‘identity’ Islam.”38  
Many non-Muslim scholars also noticed the loyalty competition between Islam 
and the liberal democracy. It can be traced back to the Enlightenment era. To these 
western observers and scholars, Islam is not referred as a modern religion but a 
political body. Jean Jacque Rousseau, for example, praised Islam as the perfect model 
of theocracy of high extent of political unity because the Prophet Muhammad 
“[linked] his political system well together.” 39  Alexi de Tocqueville, the greatest 
observer of American polity ever, also thought Islam was incompatible with 
America’s democracy because “Mohammed had not only religious doctrines descend 
from Heaven and placed in the Koran, but political maxims, civil and criminal laws, 
and scientific theories.”40  
In an article published in 1990, a Princeton history professor Bernard Lewis first 
coined the term to explain Muslims’ hatred against the west as “perhaps irrational but 
surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our 
secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.” 41  His theory was later 
developed and moderated by the late Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington 
in 1993. Huntington seeks to interpret the shifting global political order in the post-
                                                        
38 Safi, Omid, and EBSCOhost. Progressive Muslims : On Justice, Gender and Pluralism. Oxford: Oneworld, 2003. 
39 Jean-Jacques Rousseau 1712-1778 G. D. H Cole (George Douglas Howard), 1889-1959 translated G D H 
ColeLondon : J.M. Dent ; New York : E.P. Dutton. 1913 
40 Alexi de Tocqueville, “Religion Makes use of Democratic Instincts” in Tocqueville, Alexis De, Mansfield, 
Harvey C., Jr., and Winthrop, Delba. Democracy in America. Chicago, Ill ; London: University of Chicago Press, 
2002, 419. 
41 Lewis, Bernard. "The Roots of Muslim Rage." The Atlantic Monthly 266, no. 3 (1990): 47-60. 
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Cold War era. Cultural and religious identities, warns Huntington, have replaced 
ideology as sources of mass mobilization. He predicts that the conflicts between Islam 
led by the Middle East countries and the Judeo-Christian West led by the Untied States 
are inevitable because there are so many cultural and historical differences between 
the two civilizations, though he disagrees that those conflicts are destined to 
violence.42  
The second dimension of the confusion is religious. Muslims confuse with the 
relationship between Islam and American religious pluralism. As argued above, 
Islamic identity mixes religion with politics, which is exotic to Americans. To many 
ordinary Muslims and Muslim jurists Islam is the perfect and only true way of life that 
needs no reformation and change. “Islam is not a religion,” an imam working in a local 
mosque near Newton Massachusetts explained it to me during an interview, “it is Ad-
Dyn, which means the way of life for Muslims.” But in the public sphere one may also 
find that Islam is identified as a faith-centered religion and Muslims are thus a faith-
based group. Muslim leaders and activists restlessly advocate for more protection of 
religion freedom and civil rights of American Muslims. In addition, for decades many 
prominent American Muslim leaders such as Sayyid M Syeed have been advocating 
that Islam should be absorbed in the American mainstream religious platform. 
America, according to Syeed, should not be only a Judeo-Christian society but it 
should strive to be the Judeo-Christian-Islamic country.43 In one word, Muslims are 
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still struggling to assimilating in the American religious pluralist society.  
According to sociologist Peter Berger, religious pluralism does not refer to a 
platform which welcomes all religions unconditionally. Instead, religious pluralism 
comprises two implications: the state-religion relationships and inter-religion 
relations.44 In the United States, the two implications are relating with two social 
structures: civil religion and political liberalism. The civil religion is not an American 
invention. It was the French political philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau who first 
conceptualized the term. According to Rousseau, civil religion is not a true religion as 
Christianity because it concerns little of spiritual salvation. It is a social and political 
apparatus that settles state-religion conflicts over political jurisdiction. However, 
with the spread of Max Weber’s secularization thesis that argues religion is doomed 
to decline with development of modernization, the term lost its popularity. In 1967 
American sociologist Robert Bellah revived the term because he observed that 
Americans embraced “a collection of beliefs, symbols, and rituals with respect to 
sacred things and institutionalized in collectivity.”45  
The American civil religion sanctifies the American state through rituals and 
taboos.46  The sanctification manifests in President Eisenhower’s statement: “our 
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form of government has no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious faith, 
and I don't care what it is.”47 In addition, it requires a new state-religion relationship 
marked with Judea-Christian tradition. Political theorist Charles Taylor summarizes 
the American pattern in his book A Secular Age that “the population broke up into a 
host of churches, unity was nevertheless recovered by seeing all of these as part of a 
broader “church.”48 Taylor categorizes three types of state-religion relationships: 
paleo-Durkheimian, neo-Durkheimian, and post-Durkheimian. The paleo-
Durkheimian is embodied in the Middle Age Catholicism “where the social sacred is 
defined and served by the Church.”49 The post-Durkheimian model represents the 
ideal of secularization in which religion utterly quits from public and political sphere. 
The neo-Durkheimian model is the American model of civil religion. In new-
Durkheimian society citizens are able to choose their own preferred religious 
affiliation freely “but that in turn connected me to a broader, more elusive “church”, 
and more importantly, to a political entity with a providential role to play.”50 To some 
extent one can argue that all religions in the neo-Durkheimian America can be viewed 
as denominations of a broader American civil religion.  
The other source of American religious pluralism is political liberalism. Political 
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liberalism concerns the ethic aspect of America’s liberal democratic identity because 
it views political body as essentially a body of free and equal individuals with a shared 
ethic system. The Harvard political theorist John Rawls is the leading scholar on 
political liberalism. Like Taylor, Rawls admits the necessity of religious diversity but 
they have different agendas. How can diverse religious groups, Rawls asks, who hold 
different “theological and philosophical doctrines” that are believed to be true to 
achieve an “consensus” which can endorse goals of and strengthens the shared ethics 
in a liberal democracy?51 Rawls invents a conceptual platform called “overlapping 
consensus” which is a political apparatus to settle down conflicts caused by religious 
differences. As a legacy of Enlightenment movement, political liberalism suggests a 
reductive conceptualization of religion in which religion is deprived of cultural and 
ritual meanings and thus degrades to a system of beliefs and doctrines. Therefore, if 
American Muslims seeks to join the platform of political liberalism, their valued 
Islamic beliefs and doctrines must be modified in accordance with existing political 
ethics of the American society.  
The third is cultural dimension. Acculturation befuddles American Muslims 
because traditional Islamic practices are frequently at odds with American cultural 
norms and practices. American Muslims, like other religious groups, are divided on 
cultural issues. 52  With the deepening and extending modernization, religious 
pluralism, and multiculturalism in the American society since the Civil Right 
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movement, old social divisions along with “theological and ecclesiastical” differences 
no longer make sense in public sphere. Muslims, as other religious groups, are 
culturally reconstructed in two competing groups: one is conservative and another 
progressive.53 The progressive-conservative divisions, for the record, are the major 
cause for today’s polarizing politics.  
Only a very small segment of Muslims, most of who are either faculty members 
in American academia or college students, embrace progressive version of Islam. As 
opposed to conservative Muslims, some progressive Muslims advocate “social justice, 
gender justice, and pluralism.” According to Omid Safi, “being a progressive Muslims 
means not simply thinking about Qu‘ran and the life of the Prophet but also about 
thinking the life we share on this planet with all human beings and living 
creatures…our relationship to the rest of the humanity changes our way to think 
about God, and vice versa.”54 In addition, Progressive Muslims propose a unique but 
more abstract theological construction of “American Islam” that they believe 
“Muslims believe in the same values for which [the United States] was founded… They 
feel closer to the founding fathers than what America had become.”55 
On the other hand Muslims’ political association with the liberal/progressive 
coalition does not mean that Muslims are acculturating in the liberal and progressive 
political culture of the party: they remain culturally conservative. As Skerry cites in 
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his 2011 article, leading Muslim jurists keep reminding American Muslims of that the 
American society is “a corrupt and ungodly society where the fabric of daily life is 
completely at odds with the teachings of Allah.”56 Many ethnographic researches on 
American Muslims also show how Muslims feel alienated from the American culture. 
According to his in-depth ethnographic study on Muslim community in Los Angeles, 
for example, Kamibiz GhaneaBassiri points out that Muslims’ attitudes toward 
American culture are “ambivalent.”57  He lists six widely shared main moral and 
cultural complaints about American society: “alcohol, drug addiction, nudity on 
television and in movie, homosexuality, sexual intercourse outside of marriage, and 
the constant drive for wealth.” In another research that covers Muslim communities 
in five different states, Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Adair T. Lummis give us a more 
detailed list that includes “usury, loan and interests,” “welfare,” “inheritance and will,” 
“dietary restriction,” “alcohol consumption,” entertainment, gender and sex relations, 
female dressing code, “marriage,” and “divorce and child custody.”58 
Furthermore, family violence still exists among new immigrant families, 
intermarriage rate between Muslim female and non-Muslim male is low, sex 
segregation is still observed in most Islamic centers and many of Muslims’ public 
gatherings, and “leisure activities such as drinking alcohol, gambling and lotteries” 
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are still criticized as “mirage…like weapons production and marketing.”59  At the 
2017 ISNA’s annual convention some leading Islamic jurists are still discouraging 
female Muslims should avoid physical interaction, including shaking hands, with 
males in working places. Let alone ISNA’ paradoxical attitudes toward LGBTQ rights: 
when two panels on the 2017 ISNA convention were assigned to topics about 
intergroup collaboration between Muslims and LGBTQ groups, a pro-LGBTQ Muslim 
organization was asked to quit the conference and its booth was cancelled by ISNA 
because “[ISNA] were not okay with…that gays should find unrepentant inclusion 
with the Muslim community.”60 Many conservative symbols also regain popularity in 
the midst of Muslims. One of the most salient case is the widely observation of hijab 
code among American Muslim females. According to the Harvard Islamic Studies 
scholar Leila Ahmed, the hijab dress code for sure is of an Islamist origin. However, it 
also gains a new American meaning: as a symbol of public protesting for social justice 
and gender equality.61 
Research Question, Method, and Plan of this Thesis 
So how do American Muslim organizations react to these challenges under the 
political and social pressure? As it said, the American Muslim community is a highly 
diverse community. The diversity not only prevents Muslims from accepting a 
uniformed homogeneous American Muslim identity but also causes fragmentation of 
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Muslim organizations, for different Muslim sub-groups may have different 
expectations, demands, experiences, and understandings with respect to 
Americanization. Political scientists, political sociologists, and political 
anthropologists on American Muslims have contributed many valuable researches on 
domestic Muslim organizations. However, most of them are concentrating on the 
national level organizations. Relationships between national organization and local 
Islamic centers and between local Islamic centers and corresponding Muslim 
communities are seldom examined in academia. This research aims at filling the gap. 
The target organization in this research is Islamic centers. which are in general locally 
based and managed. In addition, Islamic centers and para-mosque organizations bear 
different social and political functions and they outreach and interact with Muslims 
differently. This thesis is concerned with a hitherto understudied question about the 
political disloyalty issue of American Muslims: what is the role of Islamic 
centers/mosques (in this thesis I use them interchangeably) in contributing Muslims’ 
(dis)loyalty?  
My theoretical analysis method employed in the research is inspired by the 
scientific study of organizational actions, a social science subfield focusing on 
understanding the incentive dynamics within formal voluntary organizations. The 
origin of organizational studies can be traced back to Mancor Olson’s work The Logic 
of Collective Action, who conceptualizes formal institutions as a collective action 
apparatus serving self-interested rational members.62 Rational individuals form and 
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join organizations because they have shared common interests. But, according to 
Olson, rational individual members will not automatically promote group goods if 
they find their personal cost for public good is higher than interests they receive. 
Therefore the function of organization is using different incentive/coercive measures 
to channel individuals’ interests to collective interest. At the last chapter of his book 
Olson frankly admits that though his theory can be applied to all kinds of groups in 
principle, his analysis limits on groups for material goods such as business 
associations.  
James Q. Wilson finds that even when group goals are not material, the collective 
action problems still exist. 63  He improves Olson’s model by adding two more 
incentives that can be assumed rational: solidary and purposive incentives. Wilson 
argues that rational individuals are also self-interested and calculating as pursuing 
non-material goods. Most importantly, he observes that a purposive organization not 
only passively receives its members’ common interests as its own goals, but also is 
able to redefine the common interests in some cases. In the case of local Muslim 
organizations, I follow Wilson’s group theory that I not only view Muslim 
organizations as task bearer agents but also as goal setting and defining bodies. 
Islamic centers, not only help individual Muslims’ to achieve their collective Islamic 
interests but also guide, educate, and change Muslims’ understandings of Islam. My 
basic hypothesis of this research is that the muddled Muslim loyalty is a result of 
fractural and unsystematic organizational actions so that Muslims’ loyalties are 
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channeled in different, and often opposite, directions. In other word, Muslims are 
confused because their Islamic organizations act inconsistently. 
My data is collected by participant observation. Under the supervision of 
Professor Peter Skerry from the Political Science Department at Boston College, I 
select twelve centers in Massachusetts to visit, most of them are within one hour 
driving distance from downtown Boston, Two of them are Shi’ite centers and the rest 
are Sunni ones. And I interviewed with seven imams and twenty-three leaders 
including board members and administrative officers between April 2016 to 
December 2017. I also attended ISNA’s annual conventions twice, in September 2016 
and June 2017 where I informally interviewed some leaders from the organization 
and other types of Muslim organizations across the country. And I also examined the 
relationship between ISNA and Muslim community in Boston area.  
My major findings support my hypothesis. By an in-depth analysis on 
organizational behaviors and actions of local Islamic centers in and near the city of 
Boston, I find that different Islamic centers have different organizational structures 
and relationship with corresponding Muslim communities and they have different, 
conflicting goals, tasks, strategies in maintaining mosques.  
The plan of the rest part of thesis is as followed. It is divided in three chapters. 
The first chapter is in two sections. In the first section, I briefly review and introduce 
researches on American Islamic organizations. And the second section is about an 
introduction of organizational action theory. The chapter ends with the introduction 
of my basic assumption. The second chapter is detailed case studies to test my 
hypothesis. It is of three sections. In the first section I briefly review the history of 
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national mosque building and that of Muslim community in Boston. The second 
section I will also categorize Islamic centers according to the group theory that I 
discussed in the first chapter. Then I will mainly address to how the Boston Muslim 
organizations react to the three challenges and interact with both local and national 
Muslim communities and why. The last chapter comes with my conclusion and some 
further discussion.  
I. Logic of Muslim Organizations’ Actions 
Though the focus of this thesis is on locally based Islamic centers, a brief 
discussion of the history of American Muslim community as a whole in terms of 
suiting my thesis with a broader and historical and social context. Broadly speaking, 
the power structure of American Muslim community dramatically changed after 
9/11. Empowerment of Islamist organizations is one result. As Skerry observes:  
“however much Muslim leaders and their organizations express genuine outrage 
at inaccurate and unfair characterizations of their faith, they have nevertheless 
grown dependent on such attacks, not only to sustain themselves and their 
organizations, but even more critically to pull together a disparate assortment of 
individuals, many of whom identify more with their countries of origin than with 
Islam.”64 
 
According to Yuting Wang, there were in total five major immigrant waves from 
Muslim world since the end of nineteenth century. The first three waves of 
immigrants were of almost Arab Muslims. The first wave came during 1875 till 1912, 
most of who were “uneducated, rural, young Arab men from Lebanon and present-
day Syria.” The second wave, of who “were mostly the relatives of the first wave,” 
came after from 1918 to 1922. It was during this period when Muslims started to 
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settle down in Boston area. The third wave came after the WWI, between 1930 to 
1938: political and social chaos destroyed the economy in the Middle East and it 
forced some Arab Muslims to come to reunite with their family members and 
relatives. The fourth wave came after the end of WWII. In 1965 President John F. 
Kennedy abolished the national origin quotas provision which was passed in the 1924 
Immigration Act and since then large number of Muslim immigrants from all over the 
world chose to come to the Untied States. Many Muslim-majority countries also sent 
many students to study in the United States. Many Arab Muslims came during 1960s 
and 1970s, many South Asian Muslims from Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh was also 
recorded in 1970s, as well as many Afghanis after 1979, when Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan. And the fifth wave continues till today.65 A super majority of Muslim 
immigrants came to the Untied States for secular and personal causes: better 
education, more economic opportunities, reunion with their family members. In fact, 
as Skerry observes, many of the fifth wave immigrants were not certain if they would 
stay or go back to the Muslim world when they arrived.66 
The pre-1965 generations were different to the post-1965 generation in the 
sense that the former generation had very limited attachment with Islamic identity 
and they were tepid at building their own Muslim organizations to preserve their 
cultural and religious traditions. To them, Islam was a religion which was more a 
matter of personal choice rather than a source of collective identity, given centuries 
of political quietism that had dominated Islamic world since the Mongol Conquest in 
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the thirteenth century.67 They were more identified with their own ethnic groups or 
home countries rather than with Islam. The post-1965 generation was different 
because they assumed “Islam [as] a central element of collective identity.”68 It was 
also the post-1965 generation who started a rising national-scale movement to build 
their own Islamic organizations.69  
Generally speaking, Muslims are a group of high religiosity. According to the 
2017 Pew Survey on American Muslims, estimated sixty-five percent of Muslims think 
their religion “is very important to them” and about forty percent report that they do 
salat, Islamic prayer, five times everyday. 70  However, high religiosity does not 
necessarily attract Muslims to have their own independent public worship places. 
Attendance rate of mosques remains low. Only four in ten Muslims report they 
regularly attend Islamic center activities on weekly basis. In traditional Islam, mosque 
is nothing but a physical space for public worshipping and social gatherings. Many 
Muslims, including both ordinary Muslims and mosque leaders, told me that praying 
in mosque is not obligatory in Islam. For early generation of Muslim immigrants who 
were mostly uneducated and economically disadvantaged, having their own mosques 
was expensive and unnecessary. They preferred to pray at someone’s house(s). To 
their children, they were tolerant to intermarriage with non-Muslims and even okay 
with that if some chose to leave the religion. It is because they came to the United 
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States for more economical opportunities rather than to become more pious Muslims. 
And what stood between their expectation and the reality was not Islam but their 
poor English language ability and cultural alienation from the dominating American 
society. Instead of building their own religious organizations first, the early 
generations would rather to have their own organizations to help them to assimilate 
into the American society. 
Things changed with the population of Muslims growing in the Untied States. At 
the beginning, having their “own church” gradually became necessary for the second 
generation of immigrants who were much better acculturated with the American 
society than their parents. It was because in the post-WWII era, religion instead of 
ethnicity was the new American norm to separate Americans in different groups. 
Sociologist William Herberg discussed about the phenomenon in his widely read book 
Protestant, Catholic, Jew. He argued at the very beginning of his book: “there is every 
sign of a notable ‘turn to religion’ among the American people today.”71 During this 
period Muslims were often asked with questions like “what church do you go to” or 
“why don’t [you] have a church?”72 Under the social pressure, the second generation 
of the pre-1965 generations started to build their own Muslim organizations. The 
second generation also built an Islamic organization at the national level, the 
Federation of Islamic Associations (FIA). FIA was built in 1952 by some second 
generation Arab immigrant leaders to “[form] a national organization that could bring 
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together the Muslims of America and coordinate their activities.”73 Additionally, at 
the time of the construction of FIA many of the American born Lebanese Muslims 
were of low loyalty to the United States. On the contrary, their loyalty was associated 
with “the form of love for family and sect, and when expressed in inanimate terms, 
love for the unexcelled scenery of Syria with its glorious sunshine and invigorating 
air.”74 However, as GhaneaBassiri observes, FIA gradually ceased to exist since the 
mid-1970s because it cannot reconcile conflicts between the second and third 
Lebanese generations.75 
The latecomer Muslim students from Muslim majority countries in the 1960s 
chose to have their own religious organizations in universities instead of merging 
with existing American Muslim communities of early generations. It was somewhat 
because they had not decided whether they would go home after they finished their 
education. Besides, coming from Dar-al Islam (the House of Islam) gave them a sense 
of religious privilege that they represented the “orthodoxy” form of Islam while the 
American Muslims did not. Though it was widely recognized that the first Muslim 
student organization was Muslim Student Association (MSA) at the University of 
Illinois at Urban-Champaign in 1963, I find that the Harvard Islamic Society (HIS) was 
built earlier, in 1958.76 Unlike HIS and FIA, MSA was both politically and religious 
ambitious and obviously identified with oversea Islamist organization. Its leaders 
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were passionate to the idea of global Muslim Ummah and actively, even aggressively, 
advocating against Americanization. At its thirteenth annual convention in 1975, for 
example, a leader criticized American Muslims of being corrupted by western 
civilization: “if Islam cannot be established in an area of hardly six feet we would fool 
ourselves by talking about an Islamic State.”77 
 
MSA was unable to control its internal division along with ethnic lines gradually. 
With increasing number of Muslim students who decided to stay and work in the 
United States after graduation, from MSA separated two national Islamic umbrella 
organizations: Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA) in 1971 and Islamic Society of 
North America (ISNA) in 1983. Initially ICNA was under the influence of South Asian 
Islamist organization Jamaat-e-Islami and mainly served South Asian Muslims. ISNA 
was more Arab-oriented and affiliated with Muslim Brotherhood. However, in spite 
of their political connections with oversea Islamist organizations and political parties, 
ICNA and ISNA were both registered as religious organizations and their by-laws 
explicitly regulated their goals were primarily religious such as Da’wah (Islamic 
missionary activity). About ten years after ISNA’s establishment, another 
Brotherhood associated Islamic organization at national level appeared in 1992, 
Muslim American Society (MAS). According to Skerry, the reason why MAS was built 
was similar to ICNA that “when immigrant Brothers from various countries realized 
that not only were they unlikely to be returning home but that they also needed to 
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cease operating in the United States.”78 As opposite to ISNA without “a clear mission,” 
MAS and ICNA focus on doing Da’wah to non-Muslims and converting Muslims to 
Islamist ideas.79 According to Harvard political scientist Jocelyne Cesari, the 9/11 
event was a watershed for American Muslim community because it shifted the 
strategy and focus of Muslim organizations. “After 9/11,” Cesari observes, “the 
Islamic factor…has been increasingly more influential in public perception of Muslims 
and in a way that Muslims has presented themselves in social and political interaction 
on the American public scene.”80 Since 9/11, American Muslims have been facing 
political pressures of assimilation from two sources. The first is from without—non-
Muslims who want Muslims to be assimilated in the mainstream American society 
and thus to become loyal and trustworthy American citizens. The other is from 
within—Muslim leaders who, under influences of Islamism and Islamic ideals, prefer 
a high solidary, united, and mobilized Muslim body.  
Besides the political force mentioned above, other external forces are from 
public presentation and misrepresentation of Muslims before non-Muslims. 
Recognition from non-Muslim matters because, as Charles Taylor argues, identity is 
a dialectical process.81 The public discourse with respect to domestic Muslims is 
systematically and routinely trapped with “simplistic dualisms: 
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assimilated/unassimilated; moderate/immoderate; tolerant/intolerant; 
good/bad.” 82  These dichotomies reveal that in public opinion Muslims are 
constructed as a potential deviant group that may jeopardize existing political and 
social orders in the United States, that is to say Muslim identity is perceived to be 
different to American identity. I agree with Skerry that Muslims are in general 
misrepresented in American public discourse, mass media, and political context. 
However I disagree with the liberal argument that Muslims have assimilated in the 
American society—in the word of President Obama: “99.9 percent of Muslims who 
are looking for the same thing [Americans]'re looking for.”83 
The American government’s willingness to collaborate with moderate Islamic 
leaders encouraged and then empowered American Islamists. The leaders work hard 
to overcome in-group fragmentations after the 9/11 and their efforts manifest in the 
construction of an uniformed American Muslim political identity. However, as 
Mohamed Nimer observed, “the Muslim immigrant organizational environment in 
America is [still] fractured, competitive and frequently unruly” at both national and 
local levels. 84  Yuting Wang, with her detailed ethnographic research on how a 
mosque locating in Indiana made of internal conflicts within its congregation, argues 
that ordinary Muslims differ dramatically not only in interpretation and practice of 
Islam but also in understanding of Americanization. 85  In the eyes of politically 
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ambitious Islamist leaders who seek authoritative status among American Muslims 
and policy influence in American politics, it is the weakness of American Muslim 
community. Some Muslim leaders intentionally constructed the conception of 
“American Islam” since the 9/11 in order to “to bridge the gap between Islam and the 
West and to dispel misconceptions about Muslims and Islam.”86 Their achievement 
is remarkable. According to Leila Ahmed, though “Islamists and their heirs and 
children are for the present no more than a minority of a minority…they constitute 
the most influential and most publicly visible segment of this minority. And they are 
also quite visibly and publicly the most socially and politically committed and activist 
segment of the Muslim community.”87 In addition, “the Islamist form of Islam steadily 
became the normative form of Islam, increasingly accepted now by many Muslims as 
well as non-Muslims as the one ‘true’ and ‘correct’ form of Islam.”88 
Categorization of American Muslim Organizations 
The brief history review betrays another fact that there is never a “central and 
national administration” organization representing all American Muslim community. 
The concept of a united American Islam is a post-9/11 creation.89 Different groups 
build Muslim organizations for their own causes that may conflict with each other.  
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Analysis of Muslim organizations demands a categorization of American Muslim 
organizations. Many scholars on Muslim organizations have proposed multiple ways 
of categorizing American Muslim organizations. In sum, their theories are in two 
branches. The first group evaluates Muslim organizations by the cause they serve and 
the second divides organizations by internal structure. They offer us a rich, valuable, 
and indispensable literature on the history of American Muslim communities. Karen 
Isakson Leonard, for example, is a leading scholar in the first group. She categorizes 
American Muslim organizations in two general groups: “American Islamic 
organizations” and “American Muslim political organizations.” The former, Leonard 
argues, “are chiefly groups of immigrant that emphasize religious education, spiritual 
regeneration, and [da‘wah] activities” while the latter “are also chiefly immigrant 
groups but ones that emphasize political activities…[and] advocate the participation 
of Muslims in American Muslims in the electoral politics.”90 Leonard’s categorization 
is insightful and simple enough. Following her, Jocelyne Cesari offers a work titled 
“Islamic Organizations in the United States.” Cesari discussed two types of Islamic 
organizations: religious and civic. With religious organization, she mainly refers to 
national level Islamic organizations such as FIA, ISNA, and ICNA. As to civic 
organizations, She only talks about Council of American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). 
Though her definition of religious organization is clear, her use of “civic” is confusing, 
especially given her background in political science. There is no doubt that civic and 
political actives in social science suggest two independent dimensions in public 
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sphere. Civic activities generally refer to “actions citizens take in order to pursue 
common concerns” while political activities have a much narrower implications 
which in general mean activities relating to government. 91  In social science 
researches civic and political activities are also analyzed separately. For example, in 
a research on the relationship between Mosque attendance rate and political 
engagement of American Muslims, Princeton political scientist Amaney Jamal finds 
that high mosque attendance may not necessarily increase political participation of 
American Muslims but it is associated with high level of civic engagement.92 Besides, 
there are many Muslim civic organizations that aim at social welfare, education, and 
human rights issues such as ICNA-Relief, an organization that right now primarily 
focuses on offering humanitarian aids to Syrian refugees. Not to mention there are 
over 250 full-time Islamic schools scattering around the country.93 To sum it up, 
despite of their different focuses, the first group of scholars generally categorize 
Muslim organizations in the Untied States are serving three goals: religious, social (or 
civic), and political. 
The method of the first group is inspiring and insightful. However, it tells us little 
about how to evaluate these organizations. The first group of scholars also cannot 
answer questions such as why FIA failed but ISNA succeed whereas the two 
organizations may have similar goals and why ISNA, ICNA, and MAS are independent 
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organizations instead of merging into one, they also give us little guidance why, 
though ISNA claims to be the leader of the American Muslims, only about ten percent 
of mosques choose to associate with it. The second group of scholars make some 
improvements. The second group pays off attention on the organizational structures 
of American Muslim organizations. Larry Poston, a professor in Theology teaching at 
Nyack College in New York state, is a representative scholar of this group. In his 
frequently cited research on how American Islamists practice Da‘wah in the United 
States. Inspired by the classification of Christian organizations in the Untied States, 
Poston offers us two types of Islamic organizations: one is locally based mosque 
organizations and another is para-mosque organizations. Poston’s contribution is 
that he observes the Islamist origin of the para-mosque organization in the United 
States. Almost all Muslim national organizations are para-mosque organizations with 
one exception—FIA. Like para-church organizations in Christianity, leaders of para-
mosque organizations enjoy a lot of discretion and receive very few constraints from 
local religious authorities. Poston traces the origin of the para-mosque back to the 
early period of Islamist movement. Both Hasan al-Banna and Abul A’la Mawdudi, 
founders of Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami respectively, “deliberately 
bypassed the mosque and founded agencies of their own.” 94  The merit of para-
mosque organization as opposed to mosque is that the former can avoid “excessive 
competition” among the latter that will divide the internal unity of an organization. In 
addition, unlike mosques which must have physical locations, a para-mosque 
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organization does not need a fixed place to be its headquarter. The example Poston 
gives is when Al-Banna perceived that “sermons of the mosque would not suffice to 
curb the ever-growing evils in Cairo,” he asked his Brothers to “preach fundamentalist 
Islam in coffee house.”95 And this particular un-mosqued organization form later 
evolved to be the Muslim Brotherhood.96  
Compared to mosques, para-mosque organizations have another virtue, which is 
small-sized and energetic leadership that is needed for political participation. 
Islamists believe Islam should be the principal foundation to “every Muslim society 
whatever the particular form of political order.” 97  To achieve the goal, existing 
Muslim institutions such as mosques and Ulema, a collective body of Islamic religious-
legal scholars, were not ideal to Al-Banna because those institutions represented the 
parochial and defensive sentiments and too lazy to mobilize individual Muslims. 
Unfortunately Al-Banna failed to offer a clear organizational framework. Mawdudi 
filled this gap. For Mawdudi, institutionalized approach of proselytization is 
necessary because he conceptualized Islamist movement as a political movement that 
aimed at reform the whole society in accord with Islamist ideas. He imagined “the 
creation of a small, informed, dedicated, and disciplined group who might work to 
capture social and political leadership.”98 He proposed to build “Islamic societies” 
controlled by the small groups of leadership. Unlike mosques which offer all kinds of 
religious services such as worshipping and ceremonies of marriage and funeral, the 
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ultimate goal of Mawdudi’s Islamic society should be “the awakening of the masses.”99 
Mawdudi’s framework is shown in Figure 1.100 
 
According to Poston, Mawdudi’s small group of awakened Islamists is pivotal in 
this strategic loop because it is the only place where internal religious awakening can 
be transferred to external Islamist institutional goals. In addition, this model 
explicitly announces its political goals and is adopted by many Islamist organization, 
including Jamaat-e-Islami. The para-mosque model also influenced the national 
Muslim institution-building in the United States. Some founding members of MSA, 
ISNA, and later founded Muslim American Society (MAS) were members of Muslim 
Brotherhood and some who found ICNA were members of Jamaat-e-Islami. They 
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followed the small-sized leadership model and their leadership teams were not 
selected from the mass of American Muslims whom they claim to represent nor from 
local Islamic centers associated with them.  
 
Poston’s para-mosque/mosque dichotomy is insightful because he suggests that 
there is a mutual connection between the goals that Islamic organization would like 
to achieve and their organizational structures. Peter Skerry has similar findings. In 
his article “The Muslim-American Muddle” Skerry mentions four leading para-
mosque Muslims organizations: ISNA, ICNA, MAS, and CAIR. He observes: “These so-
called paramosque organizations were both founded to overcome the inevitable 
parochialism of mosques.”101  
In sum, compared to the first group, the second group of scholars are more 
“political realistic” in the sense that they not only are aware of Muslims may share 
different goals and experience with non-Muslims, but mostly importantly, they 
implies that the differences are also a choice made by Muslim leaders through their 
organizational actions. However, this model also has flaws. It fails to appreciate the 
diversity in organizational structures of mosques and it takes for granted that the 
para-mosque organizations only exist at national level, which according to my 
research is an over-generalization. In addition, as I have argued above, most scholars 
put their attention at the national level of Muslim organizations and ignore there is 
also a diverse organizational structures at the local level. These theoretical limitation 
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demands a better analysis model. 
 
 
 
 
Purposive v Solidary Incentives and Organizational Action 
Majority of Muslims are immigrants. It means that Muslims have voluntarily 
come to the United States for multiple different causes. It also suggests that we should 
treat Muslims as rational agents who are not only self-interested but also should be 
responsible to their own actions.102 Since the 1990s, American Muslim organizations 
gradually cut their financial connections with oversea Muslim country governments 
and organizations and thus became true American voluntary associations. Like other 
voluntary associations, Muslim organizations are after some common goals that were 
shared either by their members or by Muslims the organizations claim to serve. To be 
sure, the collective action problem is inevitable. If Muslim organizations want to 
achieve the goals they seek to promote, they have to find their own ways to make of 
these problems. 
The academic inquiry on collective action problems started from Mancur Olson 
in 1962. In his book The Logic of Collective Action, Olson, for the first time in history, 
applied economic models in analysis of intra-group relation. He challenged then 
leading group theorists such as David Truman who assumed that groups always act 
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as if their members would automatically contribute to the shared goals. Old group 
theory was wrong because it did not see individual members as self-interested and 
rational calculating agents. When the personal share of cost to common goods is 
higher than the personal share of benefits one receives, collective action will not be 
possible and free riders are inevitable. Olson’s model is simple and convincing. But as 
he admits, the model explains material interest organizations better than other 
organizations because material interests are easy to calculate. Besides, Olson also 
assumes that an organization will always honestly understand and translate public 
interests as its members do.103 
Olson’s model, because of its simplicity, only argues that the size of the group 
matters. And it also fails to appreciate the importance of organizational structure. The 
late Noble prize winner Elinor Ostrom solved the problem by extending the 
application of the theory to social dilemma problems. Social dilemma problem 
assumes that without properly designed institutions, self-interested rational 
individuals will be little more than free riders who only want to enjoy the benefits at 
the minimum level of cost but often act against the group goods. Collective 
cooperation is more a result of institutional design. Therefore, Ostrom proposed a 
framework called Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD), in which she listed a 
three-step evaluation process to evaluate an institutional action from three mutually 
connecting but independent dimensions: Action situation, action arena, and 
interactions and outcomes of actions. The framework is powerful in terms of that it 
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can be used to evaluate all kinds of organizational behaviors and actions. And based 
on the evaluation results one can improve and reform institutions. In addition, 
Ostrom’s contribution is twofold. First, she reminds us of how important a properly 
designed internal institutional structure can be. And second, she suggests to us that 
the basic function of institutional structure is to channel and influence individual 
behaviors and interests. However, because the primary mission of the framework is 
more problem solving than problem explaining and understanding, and we cannot 
have a systematic categorization for Muslim organizations according to her three-
step evaluation, her framework still does not exactly fit the need of this thesis. And as 
Olson’s model, IAD may of limited range of application to institutions that pursue non-
material goals.104  
Now we turn to James Q. Wilson’s theory of organizational action. Unlike 
Ostrom’s framework Wilson’s model is more problem-understanding oriented. And 
unlike Olson, Wilson has a more comprehensive as well as analytical understanding 
of organization actions. The basic argument of Wilson’s theory is twofold. First, 
“organizations…are not neutral devices for transmitting citizen preference to public 
officials.”105 Second, organizations can solve collective action problems by “appeals 
to” solidary and purposive incentives, especially the purposive one.  
Wilson’s theory fits in the analysis of Muslim organizations because the goals 
that Muslim organizations are looking for are “intangible.” In addition, as will discuss 
in the next chapter, Wilson’s theory is of great explanatory power in cases of local-
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level Muslim organizations. It may also work for religious organizations in general. 
According to Wilson four types of incentives matter: material, selective solidary, 
collective solidary, and purposive. By selective solidary incentive Wilson refers to 
societal prestigious status in a given group that includes “offices, honors, and 
deference.” For example one may rationally join a political party for the goal of 
holding an office or simply because he or she enjoys political power. By collective 
solidary incentive Wilson means some pure forms of public goods that are available 
for everyone without exclusiveness in ownership and rivalry in consumption. Group 
identity is a perfect example. By purposive incentives Wilson suggests “intangible 
rewards that derive from the sense of satisfaction of having contributed to the 
attainment of a worthwhile cause.”106  Take charity or social justice activities for 
instance. Both solidary and purposive incentives can motivate individuals to pursue 
public goods. The two types of incentives demand different incentive mechanisms 
and generate organizational action patterns. Solidary organizations will work on 
strengthening intragroup relationships and organizations while purposive 
organizations will mobilize their followers by appealing to “larger purposes.”107 That 
is to say, to become a member of a purposive organization one does not need to know 
where and who co-members are. In addition, organizational structures change with 
different types of incentives. In general solidary organizations will be more likely to 
value democratic procedures than purposive organizations because the former rely 
on mutual connections among members while the latter do not. In return, the 
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purposive one may act more energetically than the solidary one because of its anti-
democratic structure. Therefore it is more accurate to argue that purposive 
organizations avoid collective action problems than saying they “overcome” the 
problems. Finally, Wilson is concerned more about purposive organizations than 
others because he observes that purposive organizations often depend on “threat 
appeals” that they may exaggerate the threat to organizations and “demonize [their] 
opponents.” To be sure, Wilson’s model fits the context here. It not only ask us to 
classify Muslim organizations by the collective goods they offer but also remind us to 
evaluate the dynamics within the organizations because organizations not only offer 
public goods, they may also manipulate and redefine it. Therefore, a classification of 
Muslims’ goals in the light of Wilson’s theory is the key.  
It is obvious that national para-mosque organizations are more purposive 
incentive oriented while locally based mosque organizations rely on solidary 
incentives more. As it discussed, in the post 9/11 era, Muslims accept a united, 
solidary, Islamically ruled, and highly respected Muslim community as the ideal goal 
and they do not want to compromise the ideal when assimilating in the American 
society. One can find that both solidary and purposive goods are involved here. 
Though in Islamic ideals the two goals can be achieved synchronically and 
harmoniously so long as inshallah, if God wills, in practice and real world it is not that 
easy. Pursuing both at the same time will inevitably demand coalition between 
solidary organizations and purposive organizations but it is hard because the 
collective action problems the solidary organizations try hard to conquer is what 
purposive organizations struggle to avoid.  
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The purpose of this thesis is not to judge whether Muslims’ goals are naive, 
utopian, or, “lacking of sense of reality,”108 but to understand how their organizations 
work. In light of this chapter’s discussion, I repeat my corresponding hypothesis here: 
the muddled Muslim loyalty is a result of fractural and inconsistent organizational 
actions in the American Muslim community so that Muslims’ loyalties to Islamic ideal 
and local Muslim communities are channeled in different, and often opposite, 
directions. And the next chapter is of case studies by which the hypothesis will be 
tested. 
 
II. Case Studies 
When I started my research by interviewing American Muslims and visiting their 
organizations I was ambitious. I was looking for some sort of “general patterns” to 
explain Muslim behaviors. However, soon I realized it impossible because majority of 
Muslims are invisible in public sphere. It is very hard to target American Muslims by 
only visiting their organizations because they do not go to there. Most of American 
Muslims are not affiliated with any Muslim organizations nor majority of them attend 
public activities held by the organizations regularly. At national level, take ISNA for 
example. The capacity of ISNA’s annual convention is now about over 30,000 people, 
many of who are not ISNA’s members, which represents less than one percent of 
Muslim population. In a 2009 Gallup survey, only 12 percent of Muslims reported that 
they thought CAIR representing their interests.109 And most of the ordinary Muslims 
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I met never attend national level activities by these organizations. The performance 
of Islamic center is a little better. According to the 2017 Pew’s survey, only four in ten 
of Muslims report that they attend mosque regularly. So if one wants to examine the 
dynamics between Muslim organizations and Muslim communities, Islamic center is 
more ideal choice than the national level organizations. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to test the theoretical hypothesis mentioned above 
with data and evidence collected by myself in a one-and-half-year-long ethnographic 
research on Muslim community in the Boston area. I try to present a complicated but 
real picture of the urban area community. In this community, I find that both 
solidarity and purposive incentives matter to local Islamic centers and conflicts and 
tensions do exist in the pursuit of these goals. I do not pretend to claim that the 
Muslim community in Boston is representative of the American Muslim community. I 
chose to study the community initially because I study at Boston College and it is 
convenient for me to visit nearby Islamic centers at low cost. I also realize that 
sampling bias damages this thesis’s power of generalization. After randomly and 
informally visiting mosques in other metropolitan areas such as Houston, San 
Francisco, and Philadelphia out of my personal curiosity, I find that Islamic centers in 
Massachusetts act not identically to these in Houston, and Houston is different from 
San Francisco and Philadelphia. However, I also observed some similar patterns in 
terms of interaction with local Muslim congregations. So I am convinced that my 
findings contain some valuable information that is ignored in existing literature on 
American Muslims.  
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The plan of this chapter is following. There are two sections. I started with a brief 
review of the broader picture of American mosque-building movement. Then I will 
do a brief discussion on how the Boston community can be view as an epitome of the 
American Muslim community. I then introduce my sample of mosques. In the second 
section I will apply Wilson’s organizational theory to my cases and analyze how and 
why these organizations act in the three dimensions that may intensify tensions 
between Muslims and non-Muslims.  
American Mosque Building Movement 
Islamic center were the first Islamic organization that Muslims built in the United 
States.110 I use Islamic rather than Muslim because there were some other secular 
organizations, such as ethnic club and cultural center, established by early generation 
of Muslim immigrants with little religious purpose. For example, Turkish Cultural 
Center Boston. Though most of its members are Muslims, the goal of the center is 
purely secular. There are approximately over two thousand Islamic centers across the 
country according to a 2011 U.S. mosque survey by CAIR.111 Most of them are self-
organized by local Muslim communities. Ihsan Bagby, who now is an authoritative 
scholar on American mosques, argues that most mosques “follow the congregational 
patterns” in the sense that local Muslim congregations govern and manage their own 
mosques, fund their activities, offer religious and social services to congregational 
members, and teach Islam to next generations. 
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The primary goal that Muslims build their own organizations is twofold: 
religious and social. Muslims hope that by having their own Islamic organizations 
they can fully protect their Islamic cultures and traditions from the pressure of 
assimilation and acculturation in the un-Islamic American society. At first they 
thought all they needed were fixed physical locations to hold salat and Friday Jummah 
(weekly Islamic sermon). In Islamic tradition the mosque is nothing but a physical 
space for public worshipping and meeting.112 To many American Muslims today, this 
traditional way of understanding is still popular (For example, when I asked a school 
president of a full-time Islamic school in Rhode Island how many mosques does the 
state have, he answered me by counting in the recreation center of his school because 
students and teachers at the school practice daily salat there). Later Muslim 
immigrants realized that social gathering with co-religionists was necessary. To be a 
good Muslim, an imam told me, it is necessary to attend halaqa, Islamic lectures for 
the study of Islam because continuous learning Islam is encouraged by the Prophet 
Muhammad, “seek knowledge even unto China.” In practice, meeting friends and 
enjoy free food after halaqa, which is usually held on Saturday evening, is another 
good reason that attracts many Muslim attendees. 
In his in-depth review of American Islamic centers, Bagby argues that there have 
been two periods of mosque-building movements in the Untied States: the first was 
between 1890-1964, and the second started from 1965 till now. For pre-1965 
generation of Muslim immigrants, Bagby observes that they were very rigorous and 
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traditional in defining mosques as only a place for religious activities. So the early 
Islamic centers always came with two parts: one is mosque for religious gathering, 
and another is social center for social activities. The first Islamic center built by 
Muslim immigrants was in Highland, Michigan in 1921, when and where a lot of male 
Muslims worked in the rising car industry in Michigan. The center only lasted one 
year because “internal disputes sapped enthusiasm.”113 Internal disputes happened 
everywhere in the early period of mosque building because the early generation of 
Muslim immigrants were uneducated as well economically incapable to sustain their 
own center. Until 1960 there were estimated 120 mosques across the nation, and 
many of them were mosques associated with Nation of Islam, the black American 
Islamic movement since the early twentieth century. The Black movement was 
criticized by post-1965 generation of immigrants of teaching “unorthodox” Islam.114 
Furthermore, the post-1965 generation from oversea Muslim majority countries 
brought about a new wave of mosque building. They tended to have their own Islamic 
centers because “they were more confident in their desire to practice and not 
compromise their Islamic tradition, more resistant to assimilation, and more critical 
of American culture and politics.”115 In spite of their persistence on their “true” Islam, 
mosques built between 1965 to 2001 still performed as “ethnic religious 
institutions.” 116  Local Muslims hoped their own Islamic center to preserve their 
                                                        
113 Bagby, “Mosques in the Untied States,” in Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck, and Smith, Jane I. The Oxford Handbook 
of American Islam. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford University Press, 2014, 226. 
114 Ibid.  
115 Ibid, 229. 
116 Min, P. G. and J. H. Kim, Religions in Asian America: Building Faith Community. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira 
Press, 2002. 
52 
 
ethnic-religious identities and pass them to posterity. In addition, they had no 
ambition for aggressive proselytization as Islamists from the national organizations. 
The local Islamic centers were culturally and religious conservative and defensive as 
well as ethnically and racially exclusive. When Haddad and Lummis, for example, 
conducted a research on Islamic centers in 1987, they were able to reach out “liberal 
and moderate” Islamic centers only. 117  Additionally, in-group solidarity in local 
congregations was more important to these mosques than high religious commitment 
in practice. It is not surprising that in the 1990s many American Islamist leaders 
complained that those centers were "ethnic country clubs" and "Islamic 
fortresses."118 
The isolationist and anti-assimilation sentiments prevailing at American Islamic 
centers in the twentieth century were responsible for the long-time invisibility of 
Islam and Muslims before mass Americans. But so Muslims learnt that strangeness 
cultivates xenophobia. The 9/11 forced many Islamic centers to open their door to 
general American public and seek a broader coalition with other Muslim 
organizations and groups. Increasing numbers of invitations for interfaith events, of 
non-Muslim visitors, of Muslims from different ethnic, cultural, and sectarian 
backgrounds, and of social, media, and political outreach activities change the 
behavior patterns of many Islamic center: now they are more vocative than before.  
Islamic Centers in Boston 
Muslim community in Boston is in many ways an epitome of the American 
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Muslim community for four reasons. First, in Boston there is one of the most historic 
Muslim communities in the United States. The earliest settlement of Muslim 
immigrant in Boston can be traced back to the 1900s. At the beginning, seven families 
emigrated from Lebanon and Great Syria area and settled down near the Quincy 
point, Massachusetts, two of whom were Shias and the rest are Sunnis. They built the 
first local self-governed Islamic center in Quincy in 1963, ICNE, and posterity of the 
seven families had contributed a lot to build many local Islamic centers including 
Islamic Center of Boston in Wayland and Islamic Society of Greater Lowell. Second, 
the institutional diversity of Islamic centers in Boston is high. There are over twenty 
Islamic centers and mosques in Boston, serving different congregations and 
subgroups. Third, the ethnic diversity in the Boston community is representative. 
Boston is a city of universities and high tech industries, which attracts educated 
Muslims from all over the world to study and work here. Fourth, some Boston Muslim 
leaders are also active on the national stage. For example, Muzamil Saddiqi, the 
leading American Muslim jurist, used to serve as the president for Islamic Center of 
New England in 1970s after his graduation from the Divinity School at Harvard 
university. In addition, ISBCC’S Senior Imam Yasir Fahmy has been invited to speak 
at ISNA’s annual conventions since its assumption of the position in 2015, and its 
Executive Director Yusuf Vali is also nationally acknowledged for his devotion to civil 
rights activities.  
Since the earliest settlement in 1910s, Muslims had not built their own mosques 
for almost five decades. The earliest Muslim immigrants were all workers at local ship 
industry near the Quincy port and they were not economically capable to build a new 
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mosque. Besides, they concerned about the preservation of their own culture heritage 
and nationality more than religious faith because the first association they 
established was not religious at all. Bearing the name of Sons of Lebanon, the 
association was established “to teach children the Arabic language, help immigrants 
learn English, collect funds for charity, and discuss common concerns.” 119   The 
second generation, however, wanted a mosque. According to Mary Lahaj who was a 
descendant of the earliest seven Lebanese families, a member of Islamic Center of 
New England (ICNE) replied: “this generation wanted to relate to a church…The kids 
would come home and say to their parents, ‘How come we don’t have a church?’”120 
It is until the early 1960s the first Boston Muslim community decided to have their 
own mosque. King Saud of Saudi Arabia donated $5000. And right after the 
foundation of ICNE, the mosque was affiliated with FIA until 1981 when FIA ceased 
to exist.121  
Since the late 1960s, there are in total three major sub-waves of mosque building 
in Boston. The influx of Muslim students from Middle East, South Asia, and other main 
Muslim majority countries started the first wave. The first wave was between 1965-
1990. Arabs, Turkish, and North African Muslim immigrants were core ethnic groups 
who built their own mosques. Among many centers built in this period, there were 
two most influential ones that successively served as the most important mosques in 
the New England area. The first one is ICNE in Quincy by 1964. And the second one is 
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Islamic Society of Boston in Cambridge by 1981. The ISB was built by former 
members of Muslim Students Associations at Harvard University, Boston University, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Northeastern University. However, it was 
not primarily built for religious purposes but for social ones. I interviewed a board 
member of ISB who has served the center over three decades. I asked him why ISB is 
independent to ICNE, he replied: “we have different concerns…we as international 
students needed more resources for English training, but they, [ICNE], concerned 
with their congregation more.” 
The second wave was in the 1990s. At this period, South Asian Muslims became 
more actively in mosque building than before. In general, the South Asian immigrants 
from Pakistan, India, and a few Bangladesh in this period were with high education 
background and worked in technological, scientific, and medical area. Not only were 
they financially capable to build their own centers but also they had religious reasons. 
Majority of South Asian Muslims belong to the Hanafi sect of Sunni Islam and their 
shared language is Urdu rather than Arabic. ICNE also noticed the growth of South 
Asian community in south suburban area of Boston, soon in 1994 the ICNE Sharon 
center was built, about twenty miles away from the Quincy mosque. Shias from 
Pakistan and India also built the first Shia Islamic centers, Islamic Masumeen Center 
of New England in Hopkinton by 1995. Mosques during first and second waves were 
more or less ethnicity, race, and sect defined organizations. They were more like 
cultural centers than religious institutions. Their congregations were small in size, 
usually less than a thousand households. In addition, with few exceptions, mosques 
built in this period were also invisible among local neighborhoods. It was partly 
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because they intentionally avoid obvious Islamic symbols such as minarets or 
crescents, partly due to their absence in local interfaith communities.  
After 9/11 came the third wave. Many mosques appeared during this period. 
Unlike centers from early waves which were more “cultural clubs,” most of the new 
centers embrace “American Islam” and social justice oriented. In addition, they are 
more friendly to non-Muslim visitors. The most representative center is Islamic 
Society of Boston Cultural Center. The building of ISBCC embodied the idea: “It’s not 
just a mosque—it’s a symbol. It’s more than just a building, it’s a place that holds a 
community together.”122 In addition, the Iman Islamic Center, a shia center in Quincy 
established in 2007, was initially a charity organization helping Syrian and Iraqis 
refugees. 
I frequently and regularly visited twelve Islamic centers between April 2016 and 
December 2017. The detail of the twelve mosques is shown in Table 1. below. The 
basic method of data collecting is by participant observation and unstructured 
interview. According to a survey of Hartford Institute for Religion Research in 2015, 
there are in total 39 Islamic centers in Massachusetts so my sample covers almost one 
third of MA mosques and about half of Boston mosques. 123  The twelve Islamic 
centers that I visited are affiliated with eleven independent Muslim organizations and 
they all built by Muslim immigrants. The name of these centers are: Islamic Center of 
New England in Quincy (ICNE Quincy), Islamic Society of Greater Worcester (ISGW), 
                                                        
122 Kuhn, P. D., & Seo, H. K. (2007, October 1). Muslims celebrate mosque opening; Harvard Islamic Society 
delegation attends inaugural prayer session at the Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center [Electronic version]. 
The Harvard Crimson. from http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=519770. Accessed Apirl 2, 2016. 
123 See Rozen, David, “American Congregations 2015: Thriving and Surviving,” Hartford Institute for Religion 
Research. 2015. 
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Islamic Society of Boston in Cambridge (ISB Cambridge), Islamic Center of Boston in 
Wayland (ICB Wayland), Islamic Center of New England in Sharon (ICNE Sharon), 
Islamic Masumeen Center of New England in Hopkinton (IMCNE), Islamic Society of 
Greater Lowell (ISGW), Outreach Community & Reform Center in Malden (OCRC), 
Islamic Center of Burlington (IC Burlington), Iman Islamic Center in Quincy (IIC), 
Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center in Roxbury (ISBCC), and Yusuf Masjid in 
Brighton. In my sample the most historic one is ICNE Quincy, the largest one is ISBCC 
whose construction was finished in 2007. And the very recent one, Yusuf Masjid, 
opened its door in 2009. In my sample two Shi’ite mosques are included and the rest 
eleven are Sunni centers. 
 
Table 1. Sampled Islamic Centers 
Center Name by 
Abbreviation 
Time to 
Location 
Sect Location Jummah 
Size 
Imam Members Part-
time/Full 
Time 
ICNE Quincy 1963 Sunni Quincy 400-600 Yes Yes F 
ISGW 1979 Sunni Worcester 400-600 No Yes F 
ISB Cambridge 1981 Sunni Cambridge 400-600 No No F 
ICB Wayland 1987 Sunni Wayland <100 No Yes P 
ICNE Sharon 1991 Sunni Sharon 400-600 Yes Yes F 
IMCNE 1995 Shite Hopkinton <50 Yes Yes P 
ISGL 1995 Sunni Lowell 400-600 Yes Yes F 
OCRC 1999 Sunni Malden 400-600 Yes Yes F 
IC Burlington 1999 Sunni Burlington 400-600 Yes Yes F 
IIC 2007 Shite Quincy No No Yes P 
ISBCC 2007 Sunni Roxbury >1000 Yes/3 No F 
Yusuf 2009 Sunni Brighton 100-200 No Yes F 
Time line data is from Harvard Pluralism Project: http://pluralism.org/timeline/islam-in-boston/ Accessed on Jan 
9, 2017 
 
Solidary Mosque vs Purposive Mosque 
In this section I categorize my sample in two groups: solidary and purposive 
mosques. In reality, like Wilson argues, no organizations can survive with only one 
incentive. Solidary organizations often appeal to purposive incentives as 
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complimentary measures to strengthen the in-group solidarity, while purposive 
organizations may appeal to selective solidary incentives to recruit members with 
high commitment. But, given all mosques are legally registered as religious 
organizations, one thing is certain that they have very limited measures to offer 
material incentives to motivate its members.  
It is difficult to find a general pattern for solidary mosques in terms of 
organizational structure but some guiding principles. Solidary mosque is in general 
geographically based and governed, its congregation is of clear geographical 
boundaries, the management follows democratic procedures, the executive board has 
short terms, the internal structures tends to be simple and direct democratic, and its 
outreaching patterns tend to be moderate, defensive, and conservative. Purposive 
mosque is the opposite. It has no membership, it often has life-long board members, 
the range and boundaries of its congregation are unclear, the management is more 
hierarchical and bureaucratic, the internal structure tends to be complicated and 
issue-oriented, and its outreaching patterns are more aggressive and progressive. 
Ironically, purposive mosque adopts the para-mosque model that Poston discusses. 
So as it sounds like an oxymoron, my cases will show a para-mosque mosque can 
exist. Among the twelve mosques in my sample, only ISB and ISBCC can be 
categorized as purposive organizations, and the rest are still mainly relying on 
solidary incentives. 
It is very hard to find a consistent way to measure the size of Muslim 
congregation because different centers may have different ways of identifying their 
congregations. Congregation and membership of a given center often refer to two 
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things. Scholars like Bagby on American mosques are wrong that they overly 
generalize congregation as the basic self-government unit of a center. On the contrary, 
congregants will not automatically enroll as mosque members who have true legal 
rights to participate mosque management. In addition, to local mosque leaders, 
congregation refers to whom their mosques serve whereas membership suggests 
who will be more likely to donate money to the institution. In fact, members affiliated 
with a mosque only compose a very small proportion of the congregation the mosque 
serve. And there are two exceptions, ISB and ISBCC, because they only have 
congregations but no membership. For different mosques in the list, leaders gave me 
at least three different standards to define their congregation. The first standard is 
territory-based. Mosques were built for mainly serving Muslim communities in given 
specific geographic areas. For example, Islamic Center of Burlington, as the only 
mosque in the location, mainly serves Muslims who lives near the town of Burlington, 
Massachusetts. However, this standard works better in suburban areas than urban 
areas. In urban district, mosque congregations often overlap with each other’s. The 
second standard is by the size of Eid Prayer after Ramadan, the month of fast. It is a 
tradition that mosque will offer free food for Muslims who attend the Eid al-Fitr, the 
feast after evening Eid prayer. “Some congregants,” a board member from ISGL told 
me, “would like to travel from tens of miles away to participate the Eid al-Fitr 
[here]…because they know someone here.” The third standard of congregation is the 
number of Friday Jummah attendees. In average, the size of Friday Jummah varies 
from 100 to 600 in Boston area. The only outlier is ISBCC, due to its location at the 
vicinity of downtown Boston, the size of its Friday Jummah varies from 700 to over 
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1000. In this thesis, due to the limitation of my research that I cannot show up at 12 
mosques’ Eid al-Fitr at one night, I choose to the Jummah standard to measure the size 
of congregation.  
On acquisition of membership, there are also two main modes adopted by Boston 
mosques. One is paid membership and anther is free membership but registry is 
required. Few mosques adopt the free membership, and the average price for paid 
membership is about $100 per person per year and no more than $300 per household 
per year. Membership is a necessary requirement to participate in mosque 
management. Only members can vote for and be elected to board of directors, the 
governing body of a mosque. Election of board members is in general held on between 
October and December every year or on every other year. For some mosques, 
members enjoy some privileges. For example, Islamic Center of Boston, Wayland has 
a capacious and nicely decorated common room with nice and comforting sofas and 
a multimedia Television, and even a billiard table only but all of these are only 
available for its members. And the membership fee is as high as $700 dollars a year. 
The small size membership of local mosque has several reasons. First, it was because 
of the low attendance of Muslims. There are also an unknown number of Muslims 
identified themselves as “cultural Muslims” who do not observe most of Islamic 
obligation but still identify themselves as Muslims because “Islam is a large part of 
the world I grew up in; it is inseparable from home.”124  Second, ordinary Muslims 
will not buy membership unless they have some social connections with core 
                                                        
124 http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-muslims-islam-trump-religion-culture-
perspec-0223-20170221-story.html Accessed Jan 2, 2018. 
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members, such as founders, of a mosque. Being a member requires more involvement 
with the mosque affairs. However, for many Muslims who attend mosques irregularly, 
mosque is no more than a place to observe personal Islamic duties and an institution 
from where one can purchase religious service if he or she needs to. Besides, 
organizational affiliation is not required in Islamic traditions.  
On management there are two modes adopted by self-governed mosques in 
Boston. One is the management by a board of director generated from members. And 
the second is a co-management by a full-time imam and a Board of Directors elected 
from members. Financial reason is the key concern for the selection of management. 
Majority of mosques will select the first mode. With few exceptions, almost every 
Islamic center is suffering from financial difficulties. Major financial recourses are 
limited: donation from local congregation, incomes from paid religious services, and 
tuition income from affiliated part-time Islamic schools. Membership fees only 
constitute a small portion of mosque’s income. Hiring a full-time imam will no doubt 
increase the financial burden of a mosque. As the table shows, barely half of the 
mosques can afford their own full-time imams. 
Local centers care more on the part-time Islamic schools. It shows an ambivalent 
attitude towards the relationship between Muslim identity and American identity. 
For local mosques, offering paid after-school programs to teach school-aged Muslim 
youth is a stable and profitable income resource. For Muslim parents, they want their 
children to be raised up in an “Islamic environment,” to know some basic knowledge 
of the religion and Arabic language, and to be good but also secularly successful 
Muslims. Comparing to private full-time Islamic schools which often charge over five 
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thousand dollars a year and may not do well on academic performance, the part-time 
Islamic schools is a good choice. For the mosque leaders, cost for maintaining a part-
time Islamic school is low because almost every teacher is voluntary and their 
rewards are no more than free lunch and tuition discount if they also send their 
children to the school they teach. The principal of a part-time Islamic school in a 
mosque in Malden, Massachusetts said the school’s money often support 
maintenance of the mosque not otherwise. 
Solidary mosque as “cultural club.” The organizational diversity of solidary 
mosques is a result of diverse solidary incentives. Functionally, what may increase 
solidarity within a Muslim congregation? As Khan argues that Muslim identity 
sources includes shared group experience and memory, Islamic ideal, ethnicity and 
nationalism, and religious sectarianism and conservatism. Khan ignores, in practice, 
that socio-economic elements maybe another identity source because gap between 
rich and poor is also salient among American Muslims. On one hand, to be sure, these 
identities may divide American Muslims into different groups. On the other hand, 
functionally, these identities are also important to survive and maintenance of group 
solidarity within a given Muslim congregation. 
 In practice one often observes that sectarian identity and ethnic identity fused 
together. “Why are there so many independent Islamic centers here,” I asked during 
my first interview with the imam from Islamic Center of Burlington on a Friday in the 
late October 2016, “Isn’t it just one Islam?” “It’s Allah’s test,” he replied. He is about 
my age and recently graduated from a six-year program at an Islamic seminary 
located in Queens, New York City, where hundreds of thousands of Bangladeshi 
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immigrants reside, according to sociologist Nazli Kibria at Boston University. 125 
Before his religious education, he got his undergraduate degree in Psychology from 
the City University of New York. Obviously the question I asked was a little bit 
awkward for him given that he just relocated to Burlington two months ago. I 
apologized to him for my intrusiveness immediately. But he smiled and said it was 
okay. “In New York,” he continued, “there are a lot of mosques built unnecessarily and 
arbitrarily. When some rich men felt they disliked a mosque’s environment, they 
would have their own.”  
The Burlington’s center is about thirty-minute driving distance from downtown 
Boston. Unlike other mosques in Boston area, this one is heavily marked by South 
Asian cultures and the Hanafi school. In 1999 “49 brothers” registered the 
organization as a 501(c)(3) religious organization. Most of them were Indian-
Pakistani Sunnis. Initially they rented a place at the Burlington Plaza Shopping Center 
where they also established a part-time Islamic school to educate their children about 
Islam after school. Many of the founders were in lucrative professions such as medical 
doctor, IT programmers, and engineers. The congregation grew soon. In 2004, the 
center bought the property of its current location from a Catholic organization 
Knights of Columbus and relocated after. Having their own mosque had been a dream 
of the Burlington communities for years, besides the plaza had been complaining that 
there was no sufficient parking space for them during Friday Jummah because the 
congregation was over five hundred families by the time. Most importantly, they 
                                                        
125 See Kibria, Nazli. Muslims in Motion : Islam and National Identity in the Bangladeshi Diaspora. New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2011. 
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could afford the cost.  
The center had no imams for two years before they decided to hire the one that 
I talked with. One of the primary reasons is that they wanted to hire an imam trained 
in Hanafi tradition. They wanted to hire an imam who could manage the center as 
administrator in accord with their Hanafi ways.  
I was allowed to observe Friday’s Jummah when the interview was over. The 
room was soon so occupied that I had to curl myself up at a corner, and, as I later 
known, there is another same-sized room on the back of the building for salat and it 
was also crowded. By my calculation the size of the Jummah was over five hundred. I 
immediately recognized by skin color that most of the attendees were South Asians 
because their skin is a bit darker than me, and the rest were blacks and White 
Muslims. The Jummah’s topic was about the absurdity of Darwin’s evolution theory. 
Realizing that many of the attendees were medical doctors who were working at 
hospitals nearby, the imam criticized Darwin’s theory “untrue” because the Holy 
Qu’ran has said that it was Allah who created everything. After the Jummah, the imam 
introduced me to an attendee who came from Quincy, Massachusetts, where is about 
one hour driving away from Burlington on weekdays. After I introduced myself and 
exchanged cards, the guy rushed back to Quincy. Burlington’s center is a perfect 
example for what I call “solidary” mosque because the center depends on and shapes 
a highly identical ethnic and sectarian identity shared by the congregation.  
Another example for solidary mosque shows that common group memory 
matters, which is ICNE in Quincy. Unlike Burlington’s center, the Quincy mosque is 
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ethnically mixed.126 Serving one of the most historical Muslim congregations in the 
United States, the center also relies on solidary incentives of shared experience. The 
Quincy mosque was different from Burlington in the sense that one can sense no 
affiliation with any of Islamic fiqh schools. Many families in the congregation of the 
Quincy mosque, as the president of the center told me, had been here for two or three 
generations. I randomly chatted with an elderly African American Muslim when I was 
waiting for the imam’s office hour. I thought he was also waiting for the imam, but I 
was wrong. He was a volunteer janitor of the center and he had attended the center 
since his early twenties. He grew up in a Black Baptist tradition and converted to 
Islam after high school. “Everyone here was nice and everyone here was of good 
characters,” he said, “[and] no one here did drugs and alcohols so I converted.” After 
sharing his personal story of conversion with me, he talked about the imam and the 
center: “He (the imam) has been here many years and he knows everybody’s 
problem.” Later I learnt from the imam that he had served the center over fifteen 
years since he left Egypt. When he started his job here ICNE had already opened its 
chapter in Sharon, where is about 20 minutes of driving from Quincy on weekdays, 
and since he was the only full-time imam of the center at the time he had to serve at 
both centers. But his hard-working pays, because right now he is one of the known 
imams in Boston area.  
I visited the center four times and I observed Jummah twice. In general, the 
culture inside the center was highly conservative and the traditional dressing code 
                                                        
126 However, in some case multi-ethnic congregation is not always a good thing because it will elevate a bar of 
hiring a imam. For example, in the ICNE Quincy chapter, the imam told me that he uses three languages: Arabic, 
Urdu, and English to communicate with different segments of local community. 
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was rigorously observed. Most attendees were seniors with gray and white hair. Some 
of them dressed traditionally so that one can easily tell their Arabic background. 
Before the sermon began, a young man took off his coat and uncovered his arms 
because it was hot and occupied inside the prayer hall. The president immediately 
approached him and asked him to put his coat on because “the shirt is too short” and 
it maybe “offensive to others.”  
To some mosques, socioeconomic status matter. Take ICB Wayland and OCRC in 
Malden for examples. Wayland mosque was the second mosque that I visited in 
Boston and it is also one of the most historical Muslim centers in Boston area. The 
mosque was built by some descendants of the early Lebanese families. Unlike other 
Sunni mosques, it is the only part-time Sunni mosque in my sample: it only opens on 
Friday and weekend. The Wayland mosque has a very handsome building and a very 
large parking yard. Its building, in fact, is bigger than most full-time Islamic centers 
that I have visited in Boston, with exceptions of ISBCC, and Worcester Islamic Center 
which for some reason I did not get an opportunity to interview its leaders. 
Congregation of Wayland mosque is multi-ethnic that there is no dominant racial or 
ethnic group. The two biggest ethnic segments are Arabs and South Asians, each of 
which takes about forty percent of the congregation. In many ways Wayland center is 
an “elite” mosque for majority of its attendees are with graduate degrees and working 
in prominent professions such as doctors and engineers, and many of them are 
graduates from elite universities such as MIT and Harvard. The high socio-economic 
status limits the size of the congregation. During a regular Friday Jummah I observed, 
less than one hundred attendees, though “the prayer hall can contain more than seven 
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hundred and fifty persons at a time,” according to the president of the center. The 
Wayland mosque is also a “multiculturalist” mosque. Inside the building one can find 
decent Arabic calligraphies by a Chinese Muslim who I am quite familiar with and 
paintings with Arabic styles. Dressing code and gender separation were not 
rigorously observed: Hijab is not required, though encouraged, and both male and 
female can pray in the same room. At the basement I was amazed to find a billiard 
table and a small entertainment room but “only members can enjoy these.” I asked 
the president of the center why the center, given its wealth, chose not to hire a full-
time imam. “We don’t need one because it is not required in Islam,” immediately he 
replied, “plus we often invite many good Islamic scholars from universities in Boston 
to lead the prayers.” Then he continued, “volunteerism is the tradition of the mosque, 
me, other board members, and teachers in our Sunday school are all volunteers. We 
don’t need to hire a full-time employee.” 
As opposed to the Wayland’s elite mosque, Malden’s OCRC serves mainly for 
blue-collar and lower-middle-class Muslims. Many of the congregants are cashiers at 
grocery stores, workers at local restaurants, small business owners, and perhaps 
Uber drivers. The center rented the third floor of a five-floor business building as its 
location, which is about five minute walking distance from the MBTA station at 
Malden Center. The congregation is big but a majority are recent immigrants from 
Arabic speaking countries. So the Friday Jummah is divided in two parts: one in Arabic 
around 12:45 pm and another in English one hour later because whereas many 
attendees do not understand Arabic and many do not know English well. However, 
unlike the Wayland center, this mosque is a full-time one so that “our congregants 
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working around can fulfill their duty of salat everyday,” one of its board members told 
me. On one hand, I was told that almost everyone works at the mosque is paid, though 
not well. On the other hand the center is short of money to buy a new mosque 
building. “So why so many full-time employees”, I asked, “if you have no money, but 
some other mosques like the Wayland’s center can rely on volunteers?” The principal 
of its part-time Islamic school who was the imam of the center years ago explained to 
me: “most of our congregation are blue-collar families and they are very busy. If we 
don’t pay, no one will work here.” Another staff in the office added “we are not as rich 
as Wayland.”  
Few Shi’ites choose either to pray at Sunni mosques many do not attend any 
mosque at all because they observe different theological principles and tradition. In 
general Shiite Muslim are more rigorous in terms of ritual observation. For example, 
Shi’ite Muslims always pray on stones or small-sized clay blocks because, according 
to the Shi’ite teaching, a true prayer must be on “pure materials.” Therefore, at both 
Shiite mosques I visited there are boxes of clay clots locating by the entrances of 
prayer halls. However, Sunni Muslims believe the prayer on stone is “worshipping 
idols,” which is a sin in Islam. So if a Shi’ite Muslim want to pray in a Sunni mosque, 
he or she must take his or her own stone with. Even so, many Sunni Muslims are not 
happy with Shi’ites’ presentation in their mosques. So as long as there are sufficient 
numbers of Shiite families in a neighborhood, Shi’ites would rather like to have their 
own mosque. Both Shi’ite centers in my list, IIC in Quincy and IMCNE in Hopkinton, 
are part-time. They are part-time because there are not many Shi’ite Muslims in 
Boston. According to the 2017 Pew surveys, Shi’ites only represent 16 percent of 
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Muslim population in the Untied States. However, we have no estimate with respect 
to their percentage in the Boston Muslim community. The two Shiite centers are very 
far away from each other, one is in Quincy and another is in Hopkinton, a small town 
near Worcester, about half-and-hour driving distance from downtown Boston. 
Sectarian minority-ness alone cannot maintain a mosque: it has to be fused with 
ethnicity. The super majority of IIC’s congregation are Iraqis Shi’ites, while most 
congregants of IMCNE’s center are Indian-Pakistani South Asians. Congregations of 
the two centers are so small that most of their congregants are their members. 
However, the two centers are different in many ways dramatically. The first is dress 
code and sex separation. IMCNE is very strict with these rules that not only wearing 
hijab is required inside the center, male and female Muslims pray in different spaces 
and the female Muslims cannot even see but only hear the imam. IIC is the opposite. 
Gender separation is not followed at all and wearing hijab, like the Wayland mosque, 
is only encouraged. As to the Friday Jummah, IIC holds no Friday Jummah because the 
size of the prayer is so small that many of its members think a Jummah is unnecessary. 
But IMCNE holds Jummah, though the size is very small too—no more than twenty 
attendees. 
Solidary mosque is also troubled by many collective action problems. Take a 
small case in ISGW as example. I visited the ISGW, the second most historical Islamic 
center in Boston built in 1970s, on a Friday by the end of February, 2017 and there 
was a snowstorm on last Thursday. When I arrived at the parking lot next to the 
center’s building about 12:30 pm, about half a hour before the Jummah began. 
However, the parking lot was so covered with snow that I could not even drive in. So 
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I spent another twenty minutes looking for a street parking space. After the Jummah, 
the board member stayed and had a small meeting discussing who should be 
responsible for snow cleaning. To my surprise, they could not even reach an 
agreement. The president and some members wanted to hire someone to do the job 
but others disagree because it would spend extra money. As a result, the president 
himself had to be the volunteer and he cleaned the parking lot later alone. The reason 
why I am so surprised is that ISGW is in many ways of high in-group solidarity. The 
center demands no membership fees and mainly relies on volunteers for 
maintenance. No one is paid here, even the imam. The acting imam of the center is 
also a volunteer who is working at a university in Worcester. Though he is not paid, 
he leads the salat and Friday Jummah regularly of his choice. “We know each other 
well,” the president said, “and we can trust each other.” 
Purposive Mosque: Para-mosque mosque ISBCC and ISB represented a new type 
of mosque what I call “purposive mosque,” which can avoid many collective action 
problems that solidary mosques have to confront. Instead of serving a particular 
congregation, ISBCC is ambitious by claiming it serves the whole Boston community, 
both Muslims and non-Muslims. Structurally they adopt para-mosque organizations. 
ISB and ISBCC have no membership and their governing bodies are not 
democratically elected either. ISB have two governing bodies: one is Board of Trustee 
and another is the Board of Directors. The former nominates the latter. And the tenure 
of former is life-long. The leadership of ISBCC is complicated. Its property and land 
belongs to ISB while ISB hires MAS Boston chapter to manage the mosque. Therefore, 
hardly can one view the two mosques as true representative bodies of Muslim 
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community in Boston. As mentioned above, MAS is an Islamist-related para-mosque 
organizations. The connection between MAS and Muslim Brotherhood is still unclear 
because, according to Nimer, “the group has been testing the waters of American 
politics without deciding how to integrate their organization into the fabric of 
American civil society.”127 Meanwhile, as Skerry points out, MAS has a very small-
sized membership who are highly committed to the MAS’s cause. 
ISB has a good relationship with MAS for years and some MAS members attended 
ISB. According to Stephen Young’s dissertation on ISB, there was an often ignored 
competition between ISB and ICNE before ISBCC was built. To non-Muslims at the 
time, ICNE was the literal representative of Boston Muslims and maybe the whole 
New England Muslim community. After the 9/11 attack, “The sum total of words in 
the article concerning the ICNE was 368; the summary of the ISB’s statement and 
plans for a blood drive consisted of 65 words. Moreover, the length of direct quotes 
alone from the sophisticated and well-experienced public speaker Imam Eid of ICNE 
surpassed the entire reference to the ISB.”128 ICNE soon lost it status representing 
Boston Muslims before the media after ISBCC opened its door to the public. Both ISB 
and ISBCC are now managed by professional teams of administrators because both of 
them now put their focus on outreaching Muslim youth, interfaith, social justice, and 
sometimes political activities. Though the two centers are legally independent from 
each other, they collaborate together. The Senior Imam at ISBCC, for example, 
attended ISB’s annual fundraising event in 2017. On the other hand, ISB often send its 
                                                        
127 Nimer, “Americanization of Islamism” 
128 Young, Stephen Wesley. Islamic identity in the Islamic Society of Boston. ProQuest, 2008, 175. 
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attendees to ISBCC if they need to talk with an imam while ten minutes of driving 
away from Cambridge, at OCRC there is a full-time imam. 
“Social Justice is the first mission of ISBCC because God is merciful and justice 
who forgave Adam immediately when he acknowledged his sins,” Mr. Yusuf Vali, the 
Executive Director of ISBCC, thus told me when we first met in April 2016 at his 
office.” As an alumnus of the Class’ 05 of Princeton University, Vali has a wonderful 
profile in political and civic engagements. He “learned community organizing on the 
streets of Minneapolis when he worked on President Barack Obama’s 2008 
campaign.”129 Last year, after Trump issued the Muslim bans, he, with many MAS 
members, helped the establishment of the first Muslim civil rights organization in 
Boston, The Muslim Justice League (MJL), that “educates, organizes and advocates for 
human and civil rights that are violated or threatened under national security 
pretexts.”130 MJL and ISBCC have a close relationship. An executive director from the 
Muslim Justice League is also a board member of Boston Muslim Young Professionals, 
a sub-organization affiliated with MAS Boston.131  
Compared to other Islamic centers in Boston, ISBCC is different at its activeness 
to outreach Muslim youth, especially students in universities and colleges in Boston 
area. Solidary mosques have been ignoring the needs of Muslim students. It is 
understandable because many Muslim students will finally leave Boston, even the 
United States once they received their degrees. On the other hand, university students 
                                                        
129 https://paw.princeton.edu/article/yusufi-vali-%E2%80%9905-reaching-out Accessed June 5, 2017. 
130 https://www.muslimjusticeleague.org/our-work/ Accessed June 5, 2017. 
131 https://www.muslimjusticeleague.org/our-people/#post-582 Accessed Feb 20, 2018 
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also have different requirements for mosques to local communities. When I ask a 
member of ISB why did they think that having their own mosque was necessary, he 
answered me that a different center was needed partly because in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s many Muslim students need English help to assimilate in to their 
university while ICNE had been a mosque to local families and gave little response. 
Right now, since many MSAs have their own Muslim chaplains so Muslim students 
and ISB turned its congregation from Muslim students to the local Muslim community 
in Cambridge, not many Muslim students will choose ISB. 
ISBCC often holds activities for Muslim Students Associations in Boston area. One 
obvious reason is that ISBCC is capable of accepting many students: it has three 
imams. The senior imam is in charge of the “philosophical direction” and offer 
“spiritual guidance” for “the whole community,” Vali explained to me, and the third 
imam is responsible for leading five prayers a day. The second imam, or the associate 
imam, meets the public and is responsible for public affairs of the mosque. The 
associate imam is also offer free psychological consulting service to Muslims who 
needs the help and he is active in participating MSAs’ activities. It even outcompetes 
ISB over the youth outreaching because ISB has no imam now. “What if students 
nearby, say, from Harvard or MIT, come to your center and looking for spiritual 
guidance?” I asked the question to both an administrative officer and a board member 
of ISB. They answered identically, “I will send them to ISBCC because we could not 
offer help without an imam.” For example, I interviewed an international student 
from Saudi Arabia who studied in a post-graduate program in architecture at 
Harvard. Despite Saudi’s extremist attachment with Wahhabism, she and her family 
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are relatively moderate Hanafis. She told me that Saudi graduate students have their 
own “club” at Harvard to have their own activities. She attended one Friday Jummah 
at ISB once when she just arrived at the United States, but she “disappointedly” found 
that the sermon is “as boring as Saudi mosque.” But for ISBCC, she gave a better 
comment: “they have a variety of actives for youth, which are fun.” 
Politics, Religion, and Culture: a Complicated Picture. Both solidary and purposive 
mosques have their own strength and weakness. The division exists because of the 
diverse experience of American Muslims and it proves that there is no uniformed 
Americanization path for American Muslims. When the external social and political 
pressure for assimilation is low, the fragmented organizational network is not a 
problem, and often positive to many local communities because they can govern their 
own mosques in their own ways. However, when external pressure for assimilation 
is high, fragmentation is a problem, that the fragmented organizations will channel 
Muslim’s attachment with Islam in different directions. 
As mentioned above, Muslims are often confused in three dimensions: political, 
religious, and culture. But in real world the three are interwoven. To be sure, because 
of activeness of ISBCC in social justice and outreaching activities and their effort to 
dispel irrational Islamophobic rhetoric, the situation of Muslims in Boston improved 
a lot. Increasing number of new Muslim immigrants to Boston are more likely to go 
to ISBCC than other mosques. Under the influence of MAS’s Islamist ideology, leaders 
at ISBCC advocate that it’s an Islamic duty to participate in politics and civic activities 
because Muslims is duty-bound to save the humanity. Because of it, ISBCC has now 
defeated other mosques: it is now the most vocal Islamic center in New England and 
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its Senior Imam is frequently invited to speak before the public representing Muslims 
in Boston.  
But the political unity is unstable and often illusory partly because the rise of 
purposive mosques like ISBCC does not overcome the fragmentation issue, and 
partially because politics befuddles solidary mosque leaders. In some cases, sizes of 
membership shrank after the 9/11 because many Muslims fear that by enrolling with 
a Muslim institution they will be targeted and under surveillance by the federal 
government. “They are more willing to donate cash which is more than the 
membership fee than to be registered as a member,” said the board member of ISGL. 
In addition, shifting political environment and pressure for being more active in 
outreaching activities may conflicts with needs for their congregations. Some solidary 
mosque leaders are often lingering on the issue of political participation. One imam 
explained to me that Islam disagreed with the principle of separation of religion and 
politics because “Allah is almighty.” However, he also rejected that Muslims are duty-
bound for political engagement: “it is up to personal choice. If some leaders think they 
are capable of leading the whole Ummah, so be it. Only Allah knows.” In addition, more 
than one Sunni leader from solidary mosques told me that they were unhappy with 
Shiite because “Shiites are politically crazy,” while they remained silent on ISBCC’s 
political engagement. 
After Trump’s election, the invitation from interfaith organizations and local 
public schools flooded Burlington center’s and INCE Sharon center’s mailboxes. 
Imams became so busy even they had already politely refused most of the invitations. 
What soon followed was increasing numbers of complaints from congregants because 
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the imams had no time to pick up their phones and answered their problems. On the 
other hand, the two centers remain highly reluctant on commenting politics. Without 
notice in advance, I revisited the Burlington’s center the Friday of the election week 
for Jummah. I am surprised because the sermon barely mentioned the election. On the 
contrary, Burlington’s young imam eloquently educated his audience of the 
importance to observe five pillars during sermon: “no matter who sits in the office, a 
good Muslim needs to pray five times a day!” And it was the only time he mentioned 
the election. Similarly, I also talked with the imam of ICNE in Sharon in the following 
week. The Sharon imam is a young South Asian. He is also from New York but received 
his Islamic education overseas. I asked him if the center had some measures to 
“pacify” the local congregation or maybe support some protest activities. He replied 
negatively. “There were no big changes in the congregation” because “Muslims has 
been marginalized for decades.” With respect to political reactions, he said: “We are 
a religious institution and we should not participate in politics…if someone who really 
[have] problems I will send them to ISBCC. They can take care of it well.”  
The rise of ISBCC also intensified what Skerry argued “Clash of Generations.” On 
the one hand, the Muslim American identity is more attractive to the American born 
Muslim youth than their first generation parents because they has less cultural 
burden nor social psychological attachment with oversea relatives and friends. 
Accepting the cosmopolitan values from the American society, they often criticize 
their parents’ ethnically defined Islam of “fake Islam.” Despite a super majority of 
them answer that their religion is very important, those young generation Muslims 
are less likely to attend mosques that their parents go. On the contrary, the 
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exceptional ISBCC put youth program on the top of its agenda, and successfully gain 
popularities among MSAs in Boston area and attracts many Muslim students to 
participate its youth programs as well as its political activities. Even Muslim students 
who grew up in Boston are more likely to participate ISBCC. For example, I 
interviewed a Muslim student at Boston College whose family were members of ICNE 
Quincy. As opposed to her parents, she preferred ISBCC more because ISBCC is active 
in civil engagements and, more importantly, “I always find helps at ISBCC.”  
ISBCC’s policy in public exposure and activeness in media and public sphere is 
not always a good thing to many Muslims, including many of its attendees. For 
example, I met a white convert at ISBCC’s café told me that he was very uncomfortable 
about the occupied schedule of the Senior Imam. He said as a convert he often had 
many religious and spiritual questions with respect to Islam and religion. He admired 
Imam Yasir Fahmy very much because the imam is very knowledgeable. “But it is 
harder to make an appointment with him after Trump,” the convert complaint, “I 
haven’t seen him and Brother Vali here as often as usual.”   
Like other immigrant groups, new Muslim immigrants are often suspicious of 
African Americans. So African American Muslims were less likely to attend mosques 
where many immigrants go. At the MSA session on ISNA’s annual convention in 2017, 
Imam Khalid Latif from Islamic Center at New York University reminded hundreds of 
Muslim students who attended the session: “If you live in an any city in this country 
and there is only one masjid where all immigrants go, I will tell you without any doubt 
and hesitation that there is probably a second one where black people go.”132 It still 
                                                        
132 “MSA Session - 54th Annual ISNA Convention,” 
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happens at ISBCC. A South Asian Muslim I met in ISBCC complaint about the changing 
environment in the mosque to me because sometime “some black Muslims were not 
friendly to him.” In addition, ISBCC’s rise intensified inter-mosque competition. In 
Roxbury there are four Islamic centers: ISBCC, Mosque for Praising Allah, Masjid 
Noor, and Boston Islamic Center. Except ISBCC, the rest are all Black mosques. Unlike 
ISBCC, they are often lack of resources because the communities they served are 
lower-middle-class. Many of their attendees now, a leader from the black mosques 
subtly hinted me, were not going to ISBCC. And “it is harder to raise money.” 
Back to the hypothesis that I raised in the introduction part of this thesis that 
Muslims’ loyalty is muddled because of their confusing and fragmented 
organizational life. I think my evidence proves the test. Though the idea of a united 
Muslim community is attractive for many Muslim leaders, a purposive mosque opens 
to everyone is not always good for Muslims because purposive mosque cannot solve 
the fragmentation problem but sometimes worsens it. And compared to purposive 
mosques, solidary mosques are more likely to suffer from difficulties and confusions. 
It is a fact that more Muslims attend to solidary mosque than these to purposive ones 
and it is reasonable. After all most Muslims who come to this country is neither for 
anti-American and terrorist causes, nor for assimilation. They came here, stay here, 
and wanted their traditions to be preserved and respected. Functionally speaking, by 
maintaining and participating different solidary mosques, they can find their own 
ways to balance Americanization with their own Islamic identities. It is not saying 
                                                        
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qIqWW_rUJf4&list=PLAqEgNeiPAEul_vYxAKNIU5nuQ_Of62XR&index=14, 
accessed Oct 30, 2017. 
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they are not assimilating. They are, but in a very slow pace.  
 
III. Conclusion and Discussion 
Here comes the conclusion, this thesis is a further study of Peter Skerry’s 2011 
article, “the Muslim-American Muddle,” in which he argues that not only non-Muslim 
Americans are worrying about Muslims’ loyalty issue due to the fear of radical 
Islamism and terrorism, but also Muslims are confused. My basic argument is that 
Muslims are still suffering from their muddled loyalty. It is not because they are 
disloyal but because, in light of Grodzins, their organizations guide them in different 
directions which are not always en route to national loyalty as non-Muslims expect. 
Inspired by Morton Grodzins’s theory on social structure and national loyalty in 
liberal democracies and James Q. Wilson’s insightful study on political organizations, 
this research has sought to understand the Muslim muddle with an in-depth inquiry 
and examination on one of the most common and important Islamic organizations—
Islamic centers and mosques with an ethnographical method. The evidence of this 
thesis was collected between April 2016 and December 2017. In fact, I almost visited 
every mosque in Massachusetts. However, I was not always lucky to build strong 
connections with many centers for various reasons. In this thesis, I only select those 
mosques that I had visited more than three times. And I try my best to interview as 
many leaders as possible. I also manage to keep a geographical and sectarian balance 
in my sample. I hope to cover all types of mosques in Boston area. My findings are 
interesting, though of course often confusing and may contradicting with each other 
but I am duty-bound to report them even if it may had negative impact on the 
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generalization power of my argument. I find that Islamic centers have different goals 
and offer different incentives to overcome collective actions problems. Both solidarity 
and political engagement are valued by Islamic centers in general, but individual 
organizations have different preferences which are results of divergent immigrant 
experiences. So the organizational aspect of Muslims community is fragmented. 
However, the increasing external political pressure in the post 9/11 period did not 
overcome the problem but aggravated it by simply empowering purposive mosques 
like ISBCC in public sphere. But ISBCC cannot speak for all Muslims, it only speaks for 
itself, no matter how much I praise its leaders’ devotions to civic engagement. To be 
sure, Boston Muslims are more united than before, especially to non-Muslims, but 
fragmentation and division still exist, as they should exist.  
The research stemmed from my personal interests in the assimilation and loyalty 
issue of American Muslims. When I started my first research on American Muslims in 
November, 2015, the first question came to my mind is “why don’t Muslims abandon 
their old Islamic way of life if they claim their desire to be part of the American 
society?” As an international student from communist China who chose to pursue 
graduate degrees in the Untied States, It was hard for me to appreciate religious, 
ethnic, and cultural attachments that I found from other immigrants. Both my parents 
and professors back to China, who encourage and support me to study in the United 
States, taught me that I should “try my best” to “assimilate in the American culture,” 
and more importantly, “not to hang out with Chinese too much!” However soon I 
learnt that not all immigrants came here with the identical assimilation mission with 
me, not even my Chinese friends and school-mates. In addition, I found that ethnicity, 
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racial, and cultural differences make sense in the United States, the most pluralist 
liberal democratic society in the world: no matter how hard I tried to assimilate with 
“white circles” in the universities I went and go to, my language ability, 
unintentionally cultural habits, and values that I think important are three main 
obstacles to convince my “White American” friend to accept me as part of their group. 
I have to make choice: either to be marginalized by both groups or to accept my 
Chinese/Asian identity. My personal experience let me be empathetic to my research 
subject—Muslims. Even though they choose to come to the United States and struggle 
to be a part of the American community, it is utterly rational, reasonable, and 
necessary to stay with their original identities.  
At last, what the muddled Muslim loyalty can teach us is that we should not 
expect American Muslims to be one political community, even if their leaders desire 
political unity so much. We should keep in mind what Aristotle taught about two 
thousand years ago: “there is a point at which a polis, by advancing in unity, will cease 
to be a polis, but will nonetheless come near to losing its essence, and will thus be a 
worse polis.”133  
 
 
 
                                                        
133 Cited in Crick, Bernard. In Defence of Politics. 4th ed. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1993, 17. 
